Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-94-177 *13 September 1994*

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Court Chairman Comments on New Legal Practices

AU0909193894 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 28 Aug 94 p 2

[Interview with Chairman of the Supreme Court Zef Brozi by unidentified RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE correspondent; place and date not given: "A Practice Benefiting Both the Citizens and the Law"]

[Text] [RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE] The Supreme Court has announced new work practices that will begin from 1 September. Could you tell us in a few words what the practices are and what the new aspects are?

[Brozi] Starting from the legal competences of the Supreme Court, the parties under trial, beginning from 1 September, will not be asked to give further testimony or bring new evidence not administered by the District Court or the Court of Appeal. The parties have the right to be presented before the Supreme Court by their lawyers, who must bring up the legal problem relevant to their complaints. They (the parties) have the right to attend the trial as listeners, but not to give testimony regarding their case.

[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE] Don't you think that the parties that are not capable, or do not wish to have a lawyer, might be impaired by this new practice?

[Brozi] No. Several days before the trial takes place, the parties have the right to present in writing all their claims on the verdict they are complaining against, or any remark on the complaints of the opponent party. It should be clear to everyone that the Supreme Court has the power only to see whether the law has been implemented correctly by the District Court or the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court is not entitled to gather and assess new evidence.

[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE] Are you of the opinion that the judges should show greater care during the trials of the first and second degree?

[Brozi] This is indispensable for improving the trial quality of these courts, as well as ensuring real protection of the legitimate interests of the parties concerned. A correct concept must be created among all the citizens involved in judicial cases, according to which it is they themselves who must present the court with all the evidence in their favor. A more cautious and honest work also is required from the lawyers of the parties.

[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE] Where and how should the parties present their complaints against the court's verdict?

[Brozi] As it is known, complaints against the Court of Appeal must be presented to the Supreme Court within one month from the date the decision has been announced. The complaining party must present its complaints in writing to the District Court or the Court of Appeal. After giving the other party a copy of the complaint, the file is sent, in two copies, to the Supreme Court.

From previous practice we have noticed that the complaints are often not clearly written and the legal issues are not distinctly identified. Often the suing party does not make legal consultations with their lawyer. There is a mania to make complaints even when the complaining party is aware of being legally in the wrong. We think that the complaints presented to the Supreme Court should be formulated with the help of a lawyer. This is in the interest of the complaining person himself.

[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE] What about the Supreme Court, how could one present a complaint against it?

[Brozi] According to the Civil Procedure Code and Penal Procedure Code, a request for the defense of legislation can be made against irrevocable verdicts. Thus, if a party has complaints against a decision of the Supreme Court, it must address the chairman of this court with a request in which the reasons why this decision is contradicted must be put forward. This request must be put together with the help of a lawyer.

If the chairman of the Supreme Court considers the complaint to be correct, he then makes a request for the defense of legislation, and the case is judged either by the Collegium—when the trial has been previously canceled, or the case has been closed—or by the Plenum, when it has already been decided either to cancel the decision or keep it still in force.

[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE] What about the Plenum's decisions, can one make complaints against them?

[Brozi] No. Recently the Plenum decided not to reconsider its previously taken decisions. Thus, if a case has been decided by the Plenum, its solution is definite, irrevocable, and nobody can change it.

[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE] You have announced several times that you do not make a practice any more of receiving people. Nevertheless, every day one can see a lot of people inside the Supreme Court. How do you explain this?

[Brozi] Cancelling the practice of receiving people by the Supreme Court was one of my first decisions in this post. I have explained the reasons for it, and they conform to the law. I would like to reaffirm once again that there will be no meetings of parties with the judges or the employees of the Supreme Court for discussing their concrete cases. Any complaints should be presented according to the practice explained above.

Many citizens come to ask whether their file has come to the Supreme Court and learn when the trial is going to take place. We explain to them that they have to get this information from the District Court or the Court of Appeal, while the date of the trial will be posted in a

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prominent place in the Supreme Court no less than five days prior to the trial. The secretary's offices will not give any other information, otherwise it will be considered as a breach of the Supreme Court's rules, and the persons who have broken them will be brought to disciplinary or penal responsibility.

[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE] What about the complaints and charges on [passage indistinct] where are the citizens supposed to address them to?

[Brozi] A lot of letters reach me, in which various citizens complain about some judges, accusing them of corruption. However, the citizens must address these kinds of complaints and accusations to the Prosecutor's Office or the High Council of Justice. It is not in my power, as chairman of the Supreme Court, to appoint, fire, or take punitive actions against judges.

[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE] Thank you.

Commentary: Greece Sees Forgiving as Weakness

AU1209134594 Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 8 Sep 94 p 1

[P. Skenderi commentary: "Albania has Forgiven Greece"]

[Text] Five Albanian citizens of Greek origin were convicted yesterday on charges of spying for the Greek secret intelligence service. The defendants had written letters to former Prime Minister Mitsotakis asking him for help to create a government of the imaginary "Vorio Epirus." They carried out espionage activities in collaboration with certain so-called scientific institutions in Greece. These institutions and dozens of other Greek terrorist organizations and syllogs [as published] demanding the liberation of southern Albania up to the Shkumbini River, it was said, were working for the Greek state led by Mitsotakis. The defendants had meetings with chiefs of the secret police and the Greek Foreign Ministry, which runs the anti-Albanian organizations and institutions in Greece. The defendants met the former deputy foreign minister, Tsuderu [name as published], and other Greek ministers under Mitsotakis. However, Albania forgave Greece. The defendants were not asked to state whether Bezhani, Marto, Papakristo, Sirma [four of the convicted], or Qiriazati—the last of whom did not even experience any confrontation with the law—had written letters to Papandreou or Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias. In their letters to the present Greek leadership, they demanded the liberation of southern Albania, asking for weapons to arm the Greek minority. Albania spared the present prime minister of Greece and its foreign minister, Papoulias. Albania forgave Greece. Greece, however, mistook this for weakness on Albania's part. Greece was surprised to hear nothing mentioned in the trial of the five about the letters that the Omonia leaders had sent to the present Greek head of state and Minister Papoulias, or about the secret meetings with the Greek police arranged by the Papandreu cabinet. Albania did not ask Greece whether it intended to close down its anti-Albanian, terrorist, and fascist institutions and organizations, or whether it would further increase their number.

Albania forgave Greece, whereas Greece—because Albania forgave it—is threatening Albania militarily, blocking economic aid from Europe, massacring the Albanians employed in Greece, sending them on a mission to "overthrow the Albanian Government," and has twice violated Albanian air space. Albania forgave Greece. On the last day of the trial, the courtroom was fuller than ever before of Greek deputies, journalists, envoys, and western diplomats. They took down notes on the procedures and conclusions of the trial. The western diplomats were urged to attend the trial by Greek hysteria and outcries.... The Greeks, who squabble and shriek for nothing.... Yesterday, the western diplomats of course took down in their notes that Albania had forgiven Greece. However, when are the western diplomats coming to see how Greece is killing, violating, jailing, and deporting the Albanians? When are they going to take down notes about Greece? When are they going to say "Stop" to Greece? For Albania can not forgive indefinitely. It cannot sacrifice itself. Albania has forgiven Greece. Now the time has come to ask Greece: Will the defendants convicted yesterday be the last?

CSCE Envoy Shows 'Partiality' Toward Greece

AU1209173294 Tirana BALLI I KOMBIT in Albanian 1 Sep 94 p 8

[Commentary by Gazmend Sejmini: "Is Van Der Stoel a Man of the Greek Renaissance or a Highranking Envoy of the CSCE?"]

[Text] This is the eighth time that van der Stoel has come and gone from Albania, and everybody would like to know what the impact of these frequent visits by the highranking CSCE envoy is on Albanian diplomacy.

According to reports, it turns out that in all of Mr. van der Stoel's visits, he has shown an interest in Albania's Greek minority. This is in accordance with his mission, but what worries us are his reports for the CSCE. The fact is that so far he has not submitted a single report on his visits to Albania, including his latest one. In answer to journalists' questions, he has said the same thing eight times: "I will gather information and process it in my office in The Hague and I am not yet issuing any conclusions." In actual fact, however, he has prepared nothing. In his villa in The Hague, Mr. van der Stoel's housemaid must have made a wonderful fire with his papers and no report has been presented at any of the CSCE meetings. The last time that he came to Tirana, in late August, Mr. van der Stoel did not take any particular interest in the trial; he was much more interested in finding out the situation regarding the opening of Greek schools, even there where there were no Greeks at all. Not satisfied with the schools that the Greek minority already have, he wanted to see dozens of Greek schools

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even in Kukes, Tropoje, Puke, etc., which Greek politicians would also like. Doing his utmost for the Greek schools in Albania, tired to death and exhausted after each visit, he looked more like a latterday Greek renaissance man than a highranking CSCE envoy. He should have prepared regular reports for the CSCE, from which the situation of the Greek minority in Albania and the fulfilment of their rights would have been very clear and would have thrown light on the discredited attempts by Greek diplomacy to create a climate of tension and political crisis in Albania, presenting it to the world as a country headed toward isolation.

So far, Mr. van der Stoel has admitted certain truths about the situation in Albania, such as the safeguarding of Greek minority rights and human rights in general, and the Albanian state is extremely delighted with him, as if he were talking about something that does not exist and defending us even when we do not deserve his support. The same thing happened with the trial of the five Albanian citizens of Greek origin. After meeting the defendants, Mr. van der Stoel declared that they had not been subjected to any physical violence during the investigation process. This, in fact, was the undeniable truth, but nevertheless our ruling policymakers were rather pleased with this statement by Mr. van der Stoel, who went on to suggest, however, that a group of international experts should come to Albania and verify whether any violence (physical or psychological) was used against them, and only then would he really be persuaded. Even this time, however, he did not promise to put together any report. Why? Because such a report would clearly indicate what Albania is like and also what Greece, which is destroying the ancient Greek democratic traditions, is like. On the other hand, special envoy Mr. van der Stoel, a Pole who speaks Albanian, attended the trial for many days, made recordings on a couple of cassettes, but avoided giving his opinions to the press. He even admitted that he had no intention of preparing any report on it....

It is very surprising how a high envoy can stray so far from the orbit of CSCE obligations when it comes to Greece! Could it be that even he might be caught in the clutches of the Greek lobby? The fact is that he comes and goes, without jotting down any notes on his visits to Albania or ever speaking out in support of Albania's interests, even when he ought to intervene, as was the case with the latest Greek provocation of dropping leaflets openly calling for the overthrow of the system and clearly expressing Greek chauvinistic aims.

As Mr. van der Stoel is so fond of schools, he could tell us how many times he has spoken out in support of the Albanian schools in Kosova, or in support of the Albanian media and education in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], where 40 percent of the population are ethnic Albanians. Never! Why does Mr. van der Stoel not want to hear of the existence of the Albanians (Arvanites) in Greece and the abolition of their rights by the Greek state? Why such partiality from a high envoy? If he does not possess any principles of impartiality in dealing with acute problems within the framework of the CSCE, who else does?

A CSCE meeting will take place soon, and if Mr. van der Stoel had prepared a realistic report on the human rights situation on both sides of the Albanian-Greek border, explaining how these two states respect human rights, then Albanian diplomacy would have had more than support in Mr. van der Stoel's report. However, he has not done such a thing, because the Greeks do not like it.

Leftist Opposition to Constituent Assembly Viewed

AU1309100594 Tirana BASHKIMI in Albanian 3 Sep 94 p 1

[Editorial: "The Baby or the Midwife"]

[Text] While the deadline for approval of the constitution nears—President Berisha told an EC delegation that it will be approved this fall—the Tirana press has burst into a veritable uproar, not over the deadline for its approval or its contents, but over the Constituent Assembly. Some time ago, in a news conference, Mr. Berisha put forward the idea of a Constituent Assembly to approve our state's fundamental document. According to him, there is no reason why mayors who have won three times as many votes as a parliamentary deputy should be denied this historic moment. The same could be said for intellectuals and other distinguished figures of our nation. The idea was also backed by a meeting of PD [Democratic Party] activists.

Now, when public attention is focused on the crisis between Tirana and Athens, the left-wing newspapers are asking why we need an assembly. According to the socialist daily ZERI I POPULLIT, the idea of a decree on the assembly is the "culmination of tribalism, cynicism, and hypocrisy." A statement by the PS [Socialist Party] describes it as an "anti-constitutional putsch." This viewpoint is supported by ALEANCA DEMOKRATIKE, according to which an assembly decreed by the President constitutes a "coup d'etat" (against whom, their opponents wonder, is this coup directed, given that the PD itself is in power?). KOHA JONE, whose opinions coincide with, or are very similar to, those of the PS and PAD [Democratic Alliance Party], argues that this is the same route as that taken by the dictator Hoxha in 1946. In its newspaper, the PSD [Social Democratic Party] also condemns the idea of a constituent assembly, while the PR [Republican Party], although not against the assembly in principle, does not see why it should draw observers' attention. The issue, it maintains, is being prejudged: No declaration has yet been made by any official bodies about the matter; it is just opinions that are being aired.

Some analysts believe that the opposition is here also sticking to the principle of contradicting everything that the ruling party says. Their real aim, the analysts say, is

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to attack the PD rather than find the best solution regarding the constitution. Others think that all this clamor is being raised to divert public attention from the declarations that the left-wing leaders have been making on Greek television and in the Greek press, declarations that have been described as antinational. [passage indistinct]

Yet others believe that the problem goes much deeper than that, and that it lies with the socialists—the parliamentary group of this party who, incredibly, voted against the Law on Basic Human Freedoms and Rights, a law that has been judged by the specialized international institutions as one of the most advanced charters that fully meets modern standards. Now these people want to interfere with the contents of the constitution in order to realize in subsequent chapters what they failed to achieve in the previous chapter on basic human rights and freedoms.

Given that the PD is short of two-thirds of the vote in parliament, they hope to achieve their goal by means of the voting mechanism. A Constituent Assembly would deprive them of such a possibility.

It remains to be seen whether this hullabaloo is "much ado about nothing," or whether there are other intentions hidden behind it.... In the final analysis, the President and the PD have simply given their opinions, the analysts say. Then the opposition should give its opinion, too, but why with such wrath and fury? Is not the safe birth of the baby more important than how the midwife assists?

In an interview published yesterday, Mr. W. Ryerson, the U.S. Ambassador to Tirana, said: What matters most is to have a very good constitution. This is the most valuable thing to achieve, and I would call any political boycott of the constitution for procedural reasons a political mistake.

Possible Outbreak of Cholera Reported

LD1309074494 Rome RAI Uno Television Network in Italian 0700 GMT 13 Sep 94

[Text] There is fear of a possible cholera epidemic in Albania. Three doctors from the World Health Organization have arrived in Tirana to carry out examinations on 130 patients recovering from symptoms which seem to be those of cholera. Five people have already died. There is concern also in Italy, because around 20,000 Albanians come in illegally every year.

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Zhelev Relieves Army Weapons Control Chief

AU1209162294 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Today President Zhelyu Zhelev issued a decree relieving Colonel Dimitur Mitkov from the post of chief of the Department of Armaments Control of the Bulgarian Army General Staff.

In another decree, the president appointed Borislav Stavrev as member of the Board of Governors of the Bulgarian National Bank.

Aleksandrov Claims 80 Percent Officer Support

AU1209174694 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 7 Sep 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with former Bulgarian Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov by Colonel Vladi Vladkov; place and date not given; "Retirement Does Not Relieve One of Concern for Country's Defense and National Security"]

[Excerpts] [Vladkov] Minister, how do you see the situation in the army after the personnel changes in the higher military command and the resignation of the cabinet?

[Aleksandrov] If you mean the psychological situation and not the material conditions, then things have settled down. The personnel changes, which were effected in 1994 on the basis of the General Military Service Bill, have restored legality to the personnel policy. With those changes we returned to the normal cycle of the natural personnel rejuvenation in the army. You are aware that in the last two years, because of political pressure and the obstinacy of certain General Staff commanders, officers who had reached the mandatory retirement age were not discharged from the army. Only officers who requested discharge or officers who received a negative assessment were discharged.

Lyuben Petrov, the former commander of the General Staff, insisted on preserving this practice, in other words, to continue the discharge of lieutenants, majors, and lieutenant colonels, while the colonels remain protected—mainly those colonels serving on the General Staff, the commands, the warehouses, and the billet management units.

Tension artificially provoked by political forces emerged after I had expressed a firm intention to apply Article 71 of the General Military Service Bill. In addition to becoming the favorite subject of the mass media, which like sensations, the issue prompted several officers to express their opinions. The mass media immediately interpreted this as taking sides in the "conflict" between the defense minister and the chief of the General Staff.

These statements made by the military were crude violations of the one-man-command principle, discipline, and the depoliticization of the army. Those who were mainly responsible for this were punished, but the incidents demonstrated the degree to which the officers were not informed (or disinformed) about the Defense Ministry's personnel policy.

[Vladkov] At your 25 August news conference, which took place at Sofia's Central Army Club, you said that the officer corps supported you. Do you think that you continue to enjoy this support?

[Aleksandrov] Yes. At the end of August and the beginning of September the Defense Ministry's Sociological Research Center conducted a study on the officer corps' prevailing opinions.

Some 1,034 officers (517 junior and 517 senior officers) were polled. The questions were coordinated with the General Staff.

The basic conclusion of the experts who conducted the study confirmed my personal impression of the support of the overwhelming part of the officers. The results showed that 80 percent of the officers supported the defense minister in applying Article 71 of the General Military Service Bill.

Furthermore, the officer corps has an even more radical view of the manner in which the bill is now being applied. The officers are demanding that the letter of the law be fully applied toward everyone, without distinguishing between "valuable" and "not valuable" officers.

I was especially impressed by the fact that 69 percent of the senior officers who were polled and 92 percent of the junior officers supported the minister's decision to apply Article 71 in discharging army officers.

An essential part of the senior and a predominant part of the junior officers did not support the repeated statement of the former chief of the General Staff that the discharge of 275 colonels would have a fatal influence on the army's combat and mobilization readiness. Actually, they could not have a different opinion, because in reality no more than 41 colonels were discharged from the Ground Troops, and only one captain first rank was discharged from the navy.

The opinion prevails in the officer corps that the fact that officers leave the army at their own request has a much stronger negative effect on the army's combat and mobilization readiness and discipline than discharging officers on the basis of Article 71.

I found it indicative that most of the officers think that behind the "ado" concerning the colonels there are certain political interests related to obtaining dividends at eventual elections. [passage omitted]

[Vladkov] How do you feel as an outgoing minister?

[Aleksandrov] The cabinet of which I am a member has indeed resigned, but Bulgaria cannot remain without a government until the next cabinet is formed.

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This also applies to me as minister of defense. I cannot feel myself as an outgoing minister of defense as long as the name of the new minister is not known.

I must act as a minister on the basis of the one-man-command principle. Retirement does not relieve one of concern for the country's defense and national security. [passage omitted]

[Vladkov] The military learns from the mass media about various affairs in which Defense Ministry employees are involved. Indeed, you have been attacked because of the actions of others, but how do you view Army General Lyuben Petrov's thesis, namely, that corruption in the army is in places responsible for the army's supplies; in other words—in the civilian and military-economic sector of the Defense Ministry?

[Aleksandrov] Army Gen. Lyuben Petrov got a little carried away at his midnight news conference at Sofia airport. It suffices to see the list of young men who did not report for military service to understand that certain people had been bending the law even at the time of Todor Zhivkov. Are officers from the military department not responsible for illegally postponing their military service? Once the law is violated, it does not matter whether the parents bribed someone or rendered some "service."

Publication on the "Cambodia" theme and documents with which the former General Staff commander is familiar should prompt him to be less categorical regarding the incorruptibility of the General Staff and officers.

The corruption penetrated all the state systems and the army is not protected from our society with minefields.

As far as the affairs in which the names of my employees have been involved are concerned, I can say the following: As long as their cases have not been reviewed by the Army Prosecutor's Office and specific accusations have not been leveled at them, I can do no more than suspend them temporarily. I cannot fire people because of suspicion and, as far as Iliya Marinov, the former Deputy Defense Minister on Economic Issues, is concerned, he was relieved of his post by the Council of Ministers.

The Council of Ministers appointed Major General Simeon Petkovski as acting deputy defense minister on economic issues. Certain newspapers immediately connected his name with the so-called Albanian arms deal.

I want to say most responsibly that the deal with Albania was perfect from the legal point of view. It was twice discussed by the Consultative Council on National Security at the Presidency. A report on this issue was given by myself and General Asparukhov, head of the National Intelligence Service. The Consultative Council on National Security approved the deal as perfect.

The Yemeni deal was discussed behind closed doors by the Council of Ministers. There were certain doubts and moral problems and therefore I decided to hand the material over to the Army Prosecutor's Office and ask it to make the appropriate decision. You already know about relieving Deputy Minister Iliya Marinov and the dismissals of Colonel Todor Pometkov and Major Krasimir Angelov. [passage omitted]

Zhelev Ready To Ask BSP To Form Government

AU1209170394 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] At a news briefing at the Presidency today, presidential spokesman Valentin Stoyanov said that the consultations prescribed by the constitution will commence tomorrow, before the head of state grants a mandate to the largest parliamentary group, that of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party], to form a government. If the Socialists propose a candidate for the post of prime minister tomorrow, the president is prepared to grant him a mandate to form a government immediately.

The head of state will also hold talks tomorrow with the leadership of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] parliamentary group.

Zhelev, SDS Leader Agree on Need for Elections

AU1209162194 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Today, during a meeting that lasted almost an hour and a half, President Zhelyu Zhelev and Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], discussed the parameters of the political situation in Bulgaria. The meeting was held at Filip Dimitrov's request, and Ivan Kostov also attended.

The country needs clarity, and the faster the relevant procedures evolve and reach their natural conclusion, which is early parliamentary elections, the better it will be for Bulgaria—this was what SDS leader Filip Dimitrov told the Bulgarian president. He expressed the hope that the president will hold the consultations on forming a new cabinet as prescribed by the constitution with the necessary vigor and intensity. Filip Dimitrov and Zhelyu Zhelev were of the unanimous view that there is no urgent requirement to make any amendments to the constitution precisely at the present moment.

At the meeting, they also discussed alternative proposals for amending the Electoral Law. According to Filip Dimitrov, the talks left him with the impression that President Zhelev, like the Union of Democratic Forces, also accepts that the idea of holding early parliamentary elections is more realistic and better for the country.

Early this afternoon, President Zhelyu Zhelev met with SDS deputies Virzhiniya Velcheva and Ventseslav Dimitrov to discuss the political situation in the country,

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amendments to the constitution, possible early elections, and the situation within the SDS parliamentary group.

Berov Meets BSP Leaders, Discuss Economy

AU1209174894 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Today the leadership of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] discussed with Prime Minister Lyuben Berov the activity of the outgoing Council of Ministers in the period before a new cabinet is formed.

The Council of Ministers Press Center announced tersely that the talks covered current problems in the economy. Our reporter Liliyana Yancheva obtained more information from BSP leader Zhan Videnov:

[Begin Videnov recording] It seems to me that in the intervening period the government should deal with current tasks and not permit, whether voluntarily or not, any major changes in the government of the country. In particular, today we discussed the state of the country's internal and external security and problems concerning the Interior Ministry, the judiciary, and the diplomatic service. We informed the prime minister of our apprehensions regarding the budget and the start of the agricultural year, in which respect additional bureaucratic obstacles have cropped up. According to what the prime minister said, the Council of Ministers itself and the ministers are probably unaware of them. [end recording]

BSP, Agrarian Leaders Outline Meeting

AU1209144494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Today a meeting was held between part of the leaderships of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and the Aleksandur Stamboliyski BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union]. Following the conclusion of the talks, Svetoslav Shivarov, chairman of the Aleskandur Stamboliyski BZNS, and BSP Supreme Council Chairman Zhan Videnov informed journalists of the results of the talks.

[Begin recording] [Shivarov] Regarding the principal issues that we discussed today, we reached the common conclusion that the political situation in the country is alarming and in fact constitutes a political crisis that shows every sign of exacerbating. In a democratic country facing this situation there is no alternative, no other way than to call early parliamentary elections. It is our personal view that whoever attempts to put off or delay the election issue will be acting against Bulgaria's interests and against the interests of the electors and the people. [end recording]

[Videnov] So far, all our traditional and priority partners have categorically declared they regard the solution to be to hold early parliament elections in the near future, before the end of the autumn. It is evident that the extraparliamentary left and left-of- center parties and the patriotic and intellectual formations outside parliament are not inclined to participate in attempts to form some kind of cabinet of national consensus, and are casting the entire responsibility for this onto the shoulders of parliament itself. [end recording]

BSDP, BSP Leaders Discuss Current Situation

AU1009202994 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 10 Sep 94

[Text] On 10 September at the invitation of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP] leadership, a meeting took place between Dr. Petur Dertliev, BSDP leader, and Zhan Videnov, Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] leader. The meeting was attended by Nora Ananieva, Doncho Konakchiev, Nikolay Dobrev, Nikolay Kamov, and Anzhel Vagenshtayn.

According to Mr. Dertliev the BSP and the BSDP are the only political parties in Bulgaria with an original character. They have a real ideology and a clear and categorical program, and have a role both in Bulgarian and international life.

A broad range of issues related to the political situation in the country were discussed at the meeting.

The two parties discussed early elections as a solution of the political crisis and the serious possibility of changing the model of transition. In this context they will independently search for ways of resolving the most acute problems of state and society.

The representatives of the BSP presented their motives regarding their demand to amend the Constitution. The BSDP representatives stated that the arguments presented by the BSP are unacceptable and no agreement on this issue was reached.

The possibility of adopting a new Election Law or on amending the existing one was also discussed.

The two sides agreed to hold regular consultations. According to both sides, the dialogue between the political forces at present is very important in resolving the country's basic problems.

ODS Warns of Greater Destabilization, Anarchy

AU1209202794 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 6 Sep 94 p 8

[Statement by the OSD leadership, issued in Sofia on 5 September: "Alliance for Social Democracy Position: The Main Thing Is To Overcome Anarchy With Joint Efforts"]

[Text] As might have been expected, the crisis in our country has been sharply exacerbated with the resignation of the cabinet. The direct threat of far greater destabilization is emerging. This is the result of the advancing anarchy.

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It suddenly appears that "it is bad with Berov, but it is even worse without him." His resignation clearly demonstrated that his cabinet could not function any longer without the full support of the political forces that voted for the cabinet.

The most important thing now is to overcome as soon as possible the worsening crisis. At present, it is even clearer to the Alliance for Social Democracy [OSD] that it is only possible to base a solution to the crisis on the basis of a national consensus on overcoming the lethal confrontation in our society. The problems of crime, prices, speculation, corruption, and security cannot be resolved through confrontation, but only through consensus.

After the resignation the question is how specifically to approach the solution of the most important national issues. We think that the answer consists of the following:

1. The resignation of the cabinet must be accepted immediately.

2. The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] must relinquish its mandate to form a new cabinet.

3. A cabinet formed with the mandate of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] cannot be a solution, either.

The OSD will not agree to participate in any government unless it is a government of national unity and is supported by the BSP.

The OSD thinks that it could support a government formed through the mandate of a third parliamentary force, but only on the basis of an agreement that is also supported by the BSP. Such a government must commit itself to specifically resolving the said national priorities. However, this does not seam feasible today. The question, which the BSP must also answer, is why this chance has been wasted to a large degree. Why in recent months have efforts been clearly directed toward organizing early elections, rather than toward forming a national consensus?

The people expect new elections in the situation that has emerged. If it is indeed decided to hold elections, they must be held as soon as possible. We must immediately issue a warning of two dangers. The first is a "prolonged" caretaker cabinet while parliament is dissolved. The other is endless protraction behind the scenes, something that would strengthen anarchy.

We declare again that we will not be party to such machinations.

We are convinced that elections are needed in order really to overcome the crisis. They must be prepared with a view to forming a national consensus, and produce a parliament and government that will conduct a nationally responsible policy.

Group Leadership Adopts SDS Agreement

AU1009202594 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 10 Sep 94

[Text] On 10 September in Sofia a meeting of the National Council of the United Christian Democratic Center took place. The National Council confirmed the signing of the political agreement of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] by party leader Stefan Sofiyanski on 6 September. Thirty of the 35 members of the National Councils took the floor. Thirty members voted for the agreement, three abstained, and two opposed it.

The participants also discussed the cabinet crisis. Different opinions were expressed. It was decided to complete the discussion at the Congress of the United Christian Democratic Center, which will take place at the beginning of October.

The SDS must mobilize its forces in order to win the emerging early parliamentary elections, said Stefan Sofiyanski. It is a different issue whether we can win alone against the Communists or in a coalition with other formations, he said. This will be decided by the congress, Mr. Sofiyanski added.

According to Virzhiniya Velcheva, there is no danger of a split within the United Christian Democratic Center, but the congress must precisely define the center in our politics, and determine whether the SDS in its present form is capable of waging a successful struggle to protect democracy in Bulgaria.

The United Christian Democrats decided to propose lifting the suspension of the Democratic Party to the SDS National Coordinating Council, which meets on 13 September, providing the Democratic Party signs the political agreement of the SDS member parties. For us there is only one democratic party, namely, the party we all know, said Mrs. Ekaterina Mikhaylova.

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Postelection Changes in National Council Reviewed

AU1309102994 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 31 Aug 94 p 7

[Article by "rep, CTK": "Coalition Clubs of Deputies Are More Stable Than Opposition Clubs; Only the Christian Democratic Party and the Czech Social Democratic Party Have Not Lost a Single Deputy Since the Election"]

[Text] Prague—The clubs of deputies formed after the last parliamentary election have undergone many changes over the past two years. The parliamentary clubs of the nongovernmental parties have been affected by the changes more than the coalition clubs, which are fairly stable. The opposition clubs, on the other hand, have registered very frequent changes in their composition and, in some instances, in their very existence.

The only club in the entire Chamber of Deputies that has not registered a single personnel change in the past two years is the 10-member club of the Christian Democratic Party [KDS], which no one has left nor has a single new member joined.

Among the parliamentary clubs of the nongovernmental parties, on the other hand, there is not one that has not experienced any personnel or organizational changes in the last two years.

After the last parliamentary elections in 1992, nine clubs of deputies were formed in parliament. By today, their number has increased to 11.

After Deputy Eva Matouskova left the Liberal National Social Party [LSNS] club of deputies, the number of its members dropped to four and the club was threatened with extinction. A few weeks ago, the LSNS club was joined by Republican Deputy Miroslav Kasparek, however, which has secured the club's survival.

Ten deputies are not members of any parliamentary club today and operate in the Chamber of Deputies as independent or unaffiliated [nezarazeni] deputies. Immediately after the elections, there was not even one such deputy in the Chamber of Deputies.

The new clubs and the group of independent deputies are made up exclusively of former members of the nongovernmental parties' parliamentary clubs.

The coalition now has four parliamentary clubs in the Chamber of Deputies, as it did after the election. These are, in addition to the KDS club of deputies, the clubs of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL]. After the election, the government coalition availed itself of 105 seats in the 200-member parliament. Now it has 107 seats.

The ODS club, with its present 65 members the largest in the Chamber, has experienced only one change thus far, when Josef Jezek left its ranks early this year. After a few weeks as independent deputy, Josef Jezek joined the ODA club some time ago.

The ODA club of deputies now has 16 members, two more than after the election. It has been joined, in addition to Josef Jezek, by Deputy Marta Hubova, who had originally been elected on the ticket of the Movement for Self-Governing Democracy-Society for Moravia and Silesia [HSD-SMS]. Her transfer has been the only one in the Chamber between the clubs of governmental and nongovernmental parties.

The KDU-CSL club of deputies has registered two changes over the past two years. Deputy Ivana Janu has been replaced by Deputy Jan Decker, after Ivana Janu's appointment as judge of the Constitutional Court. Jan Vrany, who had been elected into parliament for the Liberal Social Union [LSU] but who was not a member of any parliamentary club during the preceding months became a new member of the KDU-CSL club yesterday. The KDU-CSL club now has 16 members.

The parliamentary clubs of the Left Bloc, the LSU, the Bohemian-Moravian Center Party (CMSS], and the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia [SPR-RSC], in particular, have undergone major changes in parliament.

After the 1992 elections, five parliamentary clubs of nongovernmental parties were set up—the Left Bloc, the LSU, the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD], the SPR-RSC, and the HSD- SMS. In addition to those five clubs, there is now in the Chamber of Deputies also an LSNS club and a club of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM], which did not even participate in the parliamentary elections in this form and have been established only in the course of the current electoral term. Most erstwhile members of the HSD-SMS club of deputies are today active in the CMSS club of deputies.

The most numerous opposition club and the second largest club in the Chamber of Deputies is the Left Bloc. After the parliamentary election, it had 35 members; today it has 25. It has been left by 10 deputies who set up their own KSCM club and by Ladislav Rymes, who is now an independent deputy. On the other hand, it has been reinforced by Zdenek Vlcek, who had originally been elected on the ticket of Sladek's SPR-RSC.

The SPR-RSC club of deputies, which started with 14 members, has only six members left, following the departure of more than one-half of its members. Former Republicans Pavel Kulicka, Eva Matouskova, and Vitezslav Valach formed together with former LSU club members Pavel Hirs and Alfred Frommer the LSNS club of deputies. Later, Republican Miroslav Kasparek also reinforced their ranks.

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Two other former Republicans, Ladislav Nedorost and Jaroslav Unger, are now independent deputies, following a brief spell in the HSD-SMS club. Zdenek Vlcek, who had been with them in the HSD-SMS club, switched, after the breakup of that club, to the Left Bloc. The most recent departure from the Republicans' club of deputies is that of Jiri Soler, who has joined the LSU club.

The number of members of the LSU club has declined since the election from 16 to nine. Among those who have left the LSU club are, for example, Jiri Vyvadil, who switched to the CSSD, and Jaroslav Vlcek, chairman of the Green Party, who is today independent.

The majority of the nine present members of the CMSS club of deputies had been elected into parliament on the ticket of the HSD-SMS, which later changed its name to the Movement for the Self-Governing Democracy of Moravia and Silesia. Recently, the movement changed its name to the CMSS. Present members of the CMSS club also include Jiri Drapela, who had originally been elected on the LSU ticket. The CMSS and LSU clubs are, however, likely to merge by the end of the year. In that case, the merged club will have 18 members—that is, the same number as the CSSD club.

Some deputies elected for the HSD-SMS did not identify with the evolution and transformation of their maternal club, and, together with a few Republicans, they formed a new seven-member club under the HSD-SMS's original name. However, this club no longer exists because three of its members subsequently left—Jiri Bily, Petr Kavan, and Jaroslav Unger. The number of its members thus dropped below five, which, under the law, is the minimum number of deputies needed to set up a club.

Deputies Bily, Kavan, and Unger now claim to represent the Moravian National Party and, at the outset of each day of a Chamber of Deputies session, inform deputies that they participate in the session as members of that party.

The CSSD club of deputies has experienced two changes in the past two years, when its ranks were reinforced by Jiri Vyvadil, who had originally been elected for the LSU, and Michal Kraus, who had originally been an HSD-SMS deputy. With its 18 deputies, the CSSD club is now the third strongest in the Chamber of Deputies. However, the joint club, composed of LSU and CMSS deputies, could catch up with it once the two parties merge.

[Since the publication of the above article, the Czech press has reported further changes in the composition of parliamentary groups in the Chamber of Deputies. Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech on 3 September carries a 150-word "zaj"-signed report stating that "Eva Matouskova (elected for the SPR-RSC, subsequently the LSNS) became a new member of the ODA parliamentary club on 1 September." According to the report, this means that the ODA club now has 17 members. Because Matouskova switched from an opposition club to a government coalition club, the report says, "there are now 108 coalition deputies and 92 opposition deputies in parliament." Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech on 10 September on page 2 carries a 100-word CTK report stating that Ladislav Nedorost, who had been elected into parliament on the SPR-RSC ticket, became a CSSD member on 8 September and "will be admitted into the CSSD parliamentary club."]

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Russian Official Comments on NATO Expansion

AU1209183694 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 31 Aug 94 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Valeriy Ivanovich Mironov by Blazej Panik in Bratislava on 26 August: "General Mironov Is Not Convinced that Ordinary Slovaks Would Support Joining NATO"]

[Text] Colonel General Valeriy Ivanovich Mironov has been a member of the Russian Army's high command for two and a half years: He is deputy defense minister. He is 51 and, before being appointed to his current office, was commander of the Baltic Military District (later renamed the North-West Group). During the dramatic events in Moscow last year, he was in the middle of events. He was the last person with whom Alexander Rutskoy spoke on 4 October at 0530. Our reporter used General Mironov's presence at the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising for an interview:

[Panik] The Central European countries that were, not of their own will, under Moscow's wings are today looking in the other direction and want to integrate themselves into Western security and economic structures. While Russia acknowledges that it is their right and says that it does not intend to prevent them from doing so, it adds an important "but" in relation to NATO.... What is the gist of this "but"?

[Mironov] Well, you see, even during the few meetings I have had in Bratislava today (as a member of the official Russian delegation participating in the Slovak National Uprising celebrations on 26 August—editor's note), the Slovak side itself has provided an answer to your question. I am thinking of the reception by the president, as well as discussions with representatives of the Defense Ministry and Slovak entrepreneurial and commercial circles. At all levels, we heard one sentence: Yes, at a certain point, we cut off all of our contacts with Russia, and we almost made a revolution in mutual relations in a worse direction. Today, however, Russia as well as the other Eastern countries—the former Warsaw Pact members—realize and understand that the steps that led to the complete severance of our ties in political, economic, commercial, and also military spheres were obviously ill-founded.

Let us consider industrial production, for instance. Many of your industrial enterprises were oriented toward the economy of the former Soviet Union. Attempts to disrupt all of these relations and turn one's face toward the West have only led to negative consequences for the Slovak economy. The same applies to weaponry and military and technological cooperation. For example, if we just turn to the mobilization potential of the Slovak Republic.... The people who are in the reserves in your country—that is, who work in the national economy—have undergone basic military training using the famous Soviet military technology. I cannot at all imagine that you would find someone today who would totally replace your military technology and equipment. Tomorrow, the situation might require the mobilization of the armed forces, and people coming from the reserves would suddenly have to completely master new technology—new technology, the ideology of which is also new.

[Panik] We are not talking about what will happen today or tomorrow but about a clearly stated intention to integrate within several years into Western economic and security structures, which does not rule out our building good and friendly relations with Russia. In this sense, all of the decisive political parties in Slovakia speak about the intention to integrate Slovakia into NATO.

[Mironov] I will argue by asking you to tell me the name of at least one East European country, a former USSR ally, that has been integrated into the Western system....

[Panik] Not yet....

[Mironov] Who has succeeded in doing so? Bulgaria? No. Poland? No. The Czech Republic? No. Slovakia? Has anything come of these attempts? Life shows that this is not that simple. I do not intend in the least to evaluate your political parties as regards their plans in this respect. It is your business, anyway. But, apart from parties, there also are people, ordinary people. I am not convinced that they fully support the intentions that you speak of.

[Panik] It is clear that yesterday's enemies do not become friends overnight. How, in your opinion, should relations between Russia and NATO be formulated today, in view of the fact that, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the interests of both sides are playing a priority role in enforcing their geostrategic plans?

[Mironov] I agree that friendship cannot be built overnight. As far as I know, no one in our country proclaims that NATO and we should immediately become friends. Another matter is that we perceive this military and political alliance as a partner in solving many global and regional problems in the world. We have relatively close contacts in the sphere of peacemaking operations, in particular. We have also agreed to conduct joint military exercises during which both sides could share their experience in various spheres of the Armies' activities. At present, contacts on the political and military level between Russia and NATO have been significantly activated. The process of building new relations has been set in motion. This does not mean, however, that all of the problems between us have been solved or that we have nothing to share. In the same way as the United States and the whole North Atlantic Alliance have their interests in the world, so does Russia. Russia is not some third-rate country that anyone can treat as he pleases and to which he can dictate his rules of the game.

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[Panik] Let us speak about something else. Is there a line, in your opinion, that, if crossed, would entitle the Army to take power into its own hands in the interest of stabilizing the political and economic situation in Russia as a great power? And, in general, what is your opinion on General Lebed's more or less unequivocal insinuations about the necessity of effectively assimilating Augusto Pinochet's Chilean experience? How characteristic are similar opinions among Russian generals today?

[Mironov] You will not find any "loophole" in the basic principles of our military doctrine that would give the Army the opportunity to take power into its own hands. I can even say the following: I know well the views of my colleagues from the Defense Ministry leadership, individual types of troops, and the commands of military districts and armies, but I have not heard anything of the kind that you mentioned. Quite the contrary, for a relatively long period of time we have been adhering to the principle that the Army must not, in general, deal with political issues, particularly inside the country.

[Panik] However, not long ago, in October of last year, the Army did interfere in politics. This is why such questions arise.

[Mironov] I would not like to expand on this subject, not because I would be afraid to but because I know how decisions were made at that time. This is why I can say that, given the situation, it was probably impossible to decide otherwise—that is, we could not allow this process to spread to other regions and to trigger, by unleashing a chain reaction, a civil war in Russia. At that time, forgive this expression, we had to choose the lesser of two evils. But, as you know, even in this case, the armed forces that undertook those actions were by no means taking power into their own hands. Or have you perhaps heard that they were? We had the president and the government to deal with all of the subsequent issues. And, in the final analysis, even this difficult decision was made by the president.

[Panik] As supreme commander....

[Mironov] Exactly.

SNS: Voters 'Manipulated' by Preelection Polls

AU1309080994 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 5 Sep 94 p 2

[Article by "ba" in the "From Sessions of Supreme Bodies of Political Parties and Movements" column]

[Excerpt] Zilina—The Slovak National Party [SNS] Central Council held its last session before the legislative election in the auditorium of the Zilina City Hall on Predmestska Street on 3 September. The main item on the agenda was coordinating the party's rallies during the official election campaign. At an improvised news conference, SNS leader Jan Slota spoke about SNS representatives' major objections to agencies engaged in opinion polling. According to Slota, the FOCUS agency as well as Slovak Radio's Methodological Research Department and other agencies distort respondents' replies. "The voters are being systematically manipulated, and it would be best if these agencies' statistics did not appear in the mass media at all," Jan Slota said. The SNS chairman expressed the hope that, in spite of the "psychological brainwashing of voters," the SNS will win 15-18 percent of the vote in the legislative election. In the event of the pronational parties' electoral victory, the economic recession will be halted in a short time, and unemployment will drop, Jan Slota said. At the same time, he objected to IMF and World Bank interference in the internal affairs of Slovakia, saying that they make the loans conditional on "outrageous" terms. He also said that Vaclav Havel was the originator of the high rate of unemployment in Slovakia. [passage omitted]

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 5 September on page 2 carries a 100-word unattributed report on the SNS Central Council meeting that adds the following: "The SNS regards the preelection prognoses issued by statistical agencies as manipulation with people's minds. Expressions of sympathy for the SNS reportedly get into the columns of other political entities. The SNS has specific evidence of this."]

Moravcik Hopeful of Support in Election

94CH0408B Bratislava SLOVAK MIRROR in English Jul 94 pp 2, 5

[Article by Seema Sirohi: "Coalition Completes 100 Days, Moravcik Confident"]

[Text] Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik says parliamentary democracy in Slovakia is thriving and he is confident of overcoming major problems facing the nation before the September elections.

Moravcik is aggressively trying to raise Slovakia's profile abroad, securing major defense contracts and working towards an agreement with Hungary on the border question. Looking beyond Europe and neighboring countries, Moravcik undertook a pathbreaking trip to Asia, visiting India, Indonesia and Vietnam in early July to promote economic relations.

"We would like to put a bigger emphasis on mutual relationships and intensify our trade ties with Asia," he said in an interview on the eve of his departure. The visit to India is significant because New Delhi has shown interest in buying weapons from Slovakia. Discussions on India acquiring the modernised T-72 tank and the self-propelled 155-mm gun called Zuzana were an important part of the agenda.

If Moravcik clinches a major defense deal with India, it would not only help lift the struggling arms industry out of the red but also bolster the government's fortunes in the elections. The arms factories in Martin and Dubnica are reeling under heavy debt and haphazard attempts at conversion to civilian production.

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The present government is determined to put Slovakia's defense industry back in business. Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan reportedly secured an order for 270 tanks from Syria during a recent visit to Damascus.

Apart from pushing arms sales, the prime minister said he was confident of reaching an understanding with Hungary over the border question. Slovakia wants to sign an agreement on the inviolability of the border between the two countries that will end speculation on the question. "Even if we don't succeed in the actual signing of the treaty, we will complete the substantive part and the next cabinet can sign it," the prime minister said.

On the question of the rights of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, the present government is making attempts to fulfill the criteria of European institutions. Vocal leaders of the Hungarian minority are demanding bilingual signs in areas where the ethnic group is concentrated. But an agreement on what percentage of Hungarian Slovaks would qualify a town for bilingual signs has been difficult to reach. Former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, among others, has thwarted consensus in parliament.

Meciar supporters include strident nationalists who have raised questions about the loyalty of the Hungarian minority, claiming that the ethnic group would prefer to reunite with Hungary. Moravcik's government, on the other hand, wants to defuse the issue before the elections to prevent the opposition from getting undue political mileage from it.

Moravcik said the law on bilingual signs was likely to go through in the upcoming session. He also noted with some satisfaction that it was, in fact, Hungary that needed to do more for the Slovak minority within its borders. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe had made some recommendations for action to Budapest than to Bratislava, he said.

Apart from political issues, the prime minister is most concerned about the economic problems for they will ultimately make or break the current government. To raise revenue and cut the massive budget deficit, Moravcik plans to raise taxes. His government also is trying to accelerate privatization although differences remain on "how much and how fast" between the Ministry of Economy and the Privatization Ministry. The recent visit by members of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, a U.S. government agency, could lead to a substantial increase in American investment.

A man of few words to the point of being shy, Moravcik presents a sharp contrast to the feisty Meciar whom he replaced as prime minister in March after a no-confidence vote. Meciar says he will "definitely" win the national elections and he has been attacking the coalition almost daily. He has accused prominent members of the present government of corruption and kowtowing to foreign powers. Consistently topping the opinion polls, Meciar's rhetoric seems to enjoy credibility especially among the older generation.

But Moravcik appears almost unperturbed by the relentless attacks of his former boss under whom he served as foreign minister for some time before forming his own party. "I think these accusations by Mr. Meciar are untrustworthy. They are so ridiculous, they do not deserve comment," he says calmly. Moravcik insists that his government enjoys quiet support which may not be accurately reflected in the opinion polls.

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Kovacs Urges Central European 'Coordination'

AU1209091494 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 1 Sep 94 p 3

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Laszlo Kovacs by Peter Morvay, in Prague on 31 August: "I Have Met With Trust in Our New Government"]

[Text] [Morvay] What aims did you set yourself before coming to Prague and which of them have you managed to fulfill?

[Kovacs] In my capacity as minister of foreign affairs in the new Hungarian government, I considered it to be my most important task to discuss the state of bilateral relations, to determine where it is necessary, and possible, to make progress, and to exchange views on the situation of our region and Europe. As evidenced by the extremely busy agenda they prepared for me, my Czech hosts obviously regarded my visit as very important. I have arrived at the conclusion that one can feel that the Czech side trusts the new Hungarian government and its foreign policy. I have come across great candor regarding the issues under discussion. I mentioned, for example, the problems that we encounter in economic cooperation.

[Morvay] What problems?

[Kovacs] They include, for example, the lack of balance in mutual trade and the low trade exchange between the two countries in general, and the difficult starting position of Hungarian agricultural and food products on the Czech market, compared with the heavily subsidized products from the countries of the European Union. The Czech side reacted to my remarks in a very positive way. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus favorably responded to our proposal to speed up the process of eliminating customs duties within the framework of the Central European Free Trade Zone. He also gave support to our position that customs duties for industrial products could be abolished within five years at the latest.

[Morvay] What else links our two countries?

[Kovacs] Parliamentary democracy has become stabilized in both countries, extremist forces do not have any substantial influence in either of them, and our political systems conform with the European system. Another thing that we have in common are our efforts in the economic sphere—the rapid progress of transformation and development of the market. The third point is foreign policy. European integration is the strategic aim for both of us. Our efforts in this regard need to be coordinated. Another common ground is the necessity of regional cooperation, which applies to both sides. Regional cooperation strengthens the stability of this region and serves the specific interests of individual countries. We have agreed that these interests are not served by empty formalities, but by practical cooperation. It is also important that, despite the differences in the political composition of the Czech and Hungarian governments, non-ideological and pragmatic approach to problems permits very good cooperation.

[Morvay] The new Hungarian government often uses the term "historic settlement" in relation to its neighbors. What is the exact meaning of this term and does it also apply to relations with the Czech Republic?

[Kovacs] This term does not apply to the Czech Republic but to some of our neighbors, particularly Slovakia and Romania. It is necessary in relation to these countries to overcome mutual historical wrongs and centuries-old problems. Prime Minister Horn's visit to Bratislava also served that purpose, as will the visit by Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Melescanu to Budapest. No such historic settlement is necessary between Hungary and Czechia.

[Morvay] You have repeated several times during your visit that it will be easier for us to integrate into Europe when we cooperate and proceed in a coordinated fashion. Until now, however, our relations have rather been characterized by mutual competition, each endeavoring to overtake the other. Many Hungarian politicians, and a great section of the Hungarian press, have been reproaching particularly the Czech side and Prime Minister Klaus for such an attitude.

[Kovacs] Today we have a government in Hungary that does not scrutinize the past four years and looks into the future instead. The fastest and most effective way of reaching our common goal, joining the European Union, is to harmonize our efforts and not to try to become its member at the expense of others. I agreed on this point with all Czech partners with whom I have conferred.

Interior Minister Comments on Privatization Abuse

AU1309085494 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 7 Sep 94 p 4

[Interview with Interior Minister Gabor Kuncze by Szabolcs Szereto; place and date not given: "We Are Investigating the Affairs Suspected of Being Illegal"]

[Text] [Kuncze] I was given the task of making a proposal to the government by 31 August on reviewing the privatization processes. I started from the premise that we must not only investigate the past, but we must strive to reduce the possibility of abuse to a minimum. Therefore, first we need an investigation which, based on experiences gained so far, takes a close look at the constitutional law and makes proposals for the modification of various laws and regulations. Naturally, this process involves the investigations of concrete cases, because general conclusions can be drawn from individual cases. All this also means that we will have to conduct further investigation in some concrete cases. From now on, we will have to examine the relevant activity of the Office of Tax and Fiscal Auditing and the Customs and Revenue Police, because abuse can be prevented through these organizations. We can also

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learn about the use of public funds by investigating the management of budget bodies. Several committees are working in parallel and their activity is coordinated by a main privatization committee. According to the plans, the interior minister will head this committee. The government will probably decide on setting up this committee this week. Besides, we suggest that the Parliament should also set up a temporary committee, which the government will regularly inform about the state of privatization affairs.

[Szereto] The coalition parties have voiced their demand to review the privatization decisions made after 1 April 1994. Will the investigation also spread to earlier dates?

[Kuncze] I would not find it favorable to retroactively question every privatization decision, because this would disturb the economy and threaten legal security. We can continue to investigate affairs we suspect to be illegal. The decisions made after 1 April will be examined by the organization of the government commissioner in charge of privatization. We will also include the results of this investigation into our decisions regarding privatization.

[Szereto] Based on the investigations made so far, is it already possible to draw a generally valid conclusion regarding the privatization practice of recent years?

[Kuncze] A lot of decisions were made that also contradicted the internal statute of the State Property Agency and the State Property Management Corporation. This is not necessarily a crime, but it is certain that these decisions do not fulfill the requirement of equal competition conditions for every side in privatization decisions. Therefore, we should make the tender conditions stricter and guarantee that the law is observed with strict internal regulations.

[Szereto] In Parliament on 5 September, Gyorgy Timar, deputy of the Smallholders' Party, accused you of complicity because of your declaration according to which you do not wish to retroactively review the privatization decisions. Is it possible to harmonize the principle of legal security with the principle of public justice?

[Kuncze] Gyorgy Timar's statement is based on a misinterpretation. I never said that we cannot investigate a privatization affair retroactively. At the same time, it is indeed impossible to question every decision; we must only conduct investigations regarding affairs suspected of being illegal.

[Szereto] Are there any privatization affairs currently under investigation?

[Kuncze] There are such investigations under way. At the same time, it is not sure that concrete examination will result in the discovery of concrete proof in every case. Therefore, I do not yet want to speak publicly about such affairs.

[Szereto] I will, nevertheless, ask you about one: Many people questioned the legality of the privatization of the Newspaper Publishing House and the leasing of MAGYAR NEMZET and other dailies by 31 December 1994.

[Kuncze] The investigation of this affair is currently under way in the organization of the government commissioner in charge of privatization. This is necessary because this decision got wide publicity and some factors might emerge that could question the correctness of previous decisions.

[Szereto] The coalition coordination council stipulated last week that, until the new law on privatization is adopted, decisions can only be made on privatization matters that have been adequately prepared. In your view, does this partial moratorium contradict your election promise to accelerate the privatization process?

[Kuncze] There are affairs that are adequately prepared. The government commissioner can make adequate decisions in these cases. However, there are also affairs in which, in our view, privatization began on the basis of a mistaken concept, or it was prepared in a way that does not fit our privatization concept. The aforementioned moratorium deals exclusively with these affairs, because it would be unfortunate to make rash decisions that have not been prepared adequately; in these cases, it is expedient to wait until the new law is adopted.

[Szereto] In the course of the election campaign, the coalition parties said that the organizations engaged in property management must be transferred from government control to parliament control. Do the investigations carried out so far justify the need for this change?

[Kuncze] In any case, it is expedient to create a clear situation in the area of privatization. This also means that politicians should be given adequate conditions for investigation and supervision. Naturally, I would not consider it favorable if the politicians made such decisions. The new law on privatization deals with the ways of creating the conditions for parliamentary control of the privatization process.

[Szereto] Do you see any possibility for Parliament to adopt the new privatization law this year?

[Kuncze] The government commissioner in charge of privatization will have to submit the bill to the government by the end of September. Although the parliament is extremely busy, I would like very much to see the new law adopted this year.

Former KBH Chief Denies Minister's Accusations

LD1209143094 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0800 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Karoly Gyaraki, former head of the Military Security Office [KBH], has denied that during his tenure in office the KBH used illegal means. Gyaraki said this in response to the comments made by Defense Minister

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Gyorgy Keleti. Gyaraki was speaking on the "Sunrise" program on Hungarian television. He said that the KBH only used legal means and therefore he was surprised by the defense minister's statement, which—according to Gyaraki—contained deliberate distortions and inaccuracies. Gyaraki also stated that he considers it unethical to respond in more detail to the defense minister's accusations.

A parliamentary body is expected to hold a hearing in which the former KBH head is scheduled to appear.

Keleti Comments on Wife's Security Investigation

LD1209135894 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0500 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti has reaffirmed that the Military Security Office [KBH] investigated his wife at a time when he was still a Hungarian Socialist Party deputy. During an interview with Hungarian television, Keleti said that after his appointment as defense minister Karoly Gyaraki, former head of the KBH, handed over to him the dossier of the surveillance.

Mrs. Gyorgy Keleti is a civilian employee of the Army, but it has become clear that information was also gathered about persons who were not linked to the Defense Ministry. Therefore, the relevant committee of the National Assembly will set up a separate body to investigate the background of the events.

New HDF Chairman Says Party Not Divided

LD1109221094 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 2000 GMT 11 Sep 94

[From "The Week" program]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Our guest is Lajos Fur, chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Good evening.

In February you were elected as party chairman with an overwhelming majority but now, you won by a mere 35 votes ahead of your rival, Ivan Szabo. For an outside observer this result could mean that the internal differences of the HDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] have strengthened. Do you accept this?

[Fur] No. In February I was the only candidate for the chairman's post and now the two of us were left in the ring, as they say. I find this perfectly normal that the votes were divided this way.

[Announcer] However, very many people think that Ivan Szabo, who is considered to be a lot more liberal, caught up with you and this is an indication of certain changes.

[Fur] Yes, however, Ivan Szabo never characterizes himself as some sort of liberal, but he emphasizes his ties with Christian democracy. So this kind of stereotyping is unfortunate. [passage omitted] There is no significant difference between us regarding the goals and pledged political values.

[Announcer] I do not know whether you know this leaflet...

[Fur, interrupting] Yes, I know it.

[Announcer] It was disseminated at the national [words indistinct] meeting by the 24 Hour Group, or 24th Hour Group of the HDF. They accuse Ivan Szabo that during his time as finance minister he gave political consent to Gyorgy Soros to participate in the privatization of the OTP [National Savings Bank] by raising its capital by 15 billion [currency not specified]. The leaflet says Ivan Szabo should state when he plans the congress of unification of HDF and SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats]. Well, this is a state of extreme division.

[Fur] This is an ugly slander.

[Announcer] Who are these people, who belong to this 24 Hour Group?

[Fur] I do not know who belongs to it, I only have a few ideas, but whoever they are, I consider it an open provocation that cannot be reconciled with the spirit and ideology of the Democratic Forum and it deserves utmost condemnation.

[Announcer] We have information that Attila (Degany) has a role in making this leaflet and that he is a member of the 24th Hour Group. He had a confrontation with the party earlier on and with the party's foreign minister, Geza Jeszenszky.

[Fur] His various actions and roles have no significance whatsoever. This is all I can say.

[Announcer] Do you accept that Ivan Szabo, as an executive of the HDF, will cooperate with you in leading the party?

[Fur] Obviously we will cooperate in the Presidium and also in leading the party, since the result of the votes also reflected that a considerable number of people support him within the HDF. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] The public opinion poll shows that the HDF is a divided party. In your view, how can the present situation influence the autumn local government elections regarding the HDF?

[Fur] Let me say that the HDF is not a divided party and even if there were or are differences of opinion, I hope that with the new executive and the election of the new national and local leaders these will cease.

As regards the autumn elections, although it is difficult to see into the future, let me say that the HDF does not envisage itself running the race on its own. We strive, and we have already taken steps both on the national and local level, to join forces with the other parliamentary opposition parties and field joint candidates, beginning with the post of Budapest mayor to that of the smallest village. I hope that these negotiations will be successful

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and they can introduce the kind of opposition cooperation that is vitally needed. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Thank you very much.

Editorial Urges More Realistic Foreign Policy

AU1309081094 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 7 Sep 94 p 3

[Editorial by Tibor Kis: "On Earth"]

[Text] Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu probably helped the new Hungarian foreign policy—with his rather ineffectual visit to Budapest, he obviously brought it back to earth and we hope that is where it will stay, at least regarding regional issues, until the socialist-liberal government's mandate expires. Actually, this head-in-the-clouds posture was tarnished by Prime Minister Gyula Horn's visit to Slovakia because it all of a sudden turned into a comedy of errors due to the memorable affair over apologies. Straight after this came another awkward surprise: Displaying a "thorough" knowledge of the foreign minister's political image, the Pozsony PRAVDA accused poor Laszlo Kovacs of pan-Hungarian nostalgia. The Romanian foreign minister's Budapest trip, filled with banalities, was the icing on the cake.

All these together are a good lesson for Hungarian diplomacy on the subject of Central European realities—if the team is willing to learn. Fortunately, the lesson came in time and, according to the indications, it was needed.

Now for a long time, we will probably hear less about historical conciliation, the changed attitude of Bratislava and Bucharest, the softening of their national minority policy, or the interdependence of the region's peoples. Actually, it is a great pity that this will happen, that a nice but brief dream will come to such an abrupt end. However, this is the moment when Horn and his team—and, together with them, the followers of the Central European thought—have to realize that affairs in this region have turned in the right direction to such an extent that would seriously warrant putting the real historical conciliation of the peoples living in this area on the agenda. If Funar's organization can rise to be a government party in Romania, if the Slovak left wing's leader hopes to gain votes at the coming elections with statements against the national minorities and condemning the autonomy efforts, then we can state with very little risk of being wrong: The societies in question—but at least their political elites—are not yet ready for a historical conciliation.

Is it a problem that the Horn government promptly tried to achieve historical conciliation with the neighbors? Not at all—a government that has honest intentions should have ideals! However, it would be a problem if it did not take notice of the signs of rejection in time and ignored the slaps in the face.

Does that mean that the foreign affairs apparatus of the government should now turn its back on this region? Not at all; on the contrary, real politics-making is only starting now for the new Hungarian diplomacy. This involves Sisyphean labor of everyday matters in diplomacy that strictly insist on facts and is, if you like, bound to the soil, in order to assert our foreign political interests. In other words, it means practicing the ancient art of how can we achieve all that is possible with our neighbors.

Naturally, in the meantime this government cannot expect any big spectacular breakthroughs, either. However, we have to strive for good-neighborly relations even if the neighbors are unfriendly—Hungary does not have any other choice, really. Especially if we consider the fact that this is plainly what the countries of European integration expect from us. Western Europe wants agreements in Central Europe by all means, and it has expressed this objective in the clearest possible way—fortunately, not only toward Hungary but Romania and Slovakia, too. On top of this, Europe wants to see these basic treaties within a short time, linked to the continent's stability pact. It does not really have any other stipulations, therefore, these treaties probably will not be perfect. However, there is little doubt that they will be signed. They will very probably be made even if their practical use can hardly be seen and they do not bring historical conciliation for the Central European nations. It seems that, for us, this conciliation will definitely be a hope of the next century.

However, in accordance with the Balladur plan, the questioning will be done as early as May. Time is short. Until then, Hungarian foreign policy should harvest all results that can realistically be achieved at this moment, and it should give its contributions to the partners in such a way which the Hungarian minorities living in the affected states will not perceive that they have been let down.

This is a big task, in fact, in certain ways it can be said to be a grand task for a foreign policy in an impossible region like Central Europe.

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International Military Exercise Starts Near Poznan

Called 'Cooperative Bridge 94'

LD1209143394 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1005 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Five-day exercises code-named "Cooperative Bridge '94" have started at the training ground in Biedrusko, near Poznan. Taking part are more than 900 servicemen from 13 European countries and the United States. Russia, which did not reply to an invitation to participate in the joint maneuvers in Poland, is not taking part.

The soldiers are split into five multinational companies. They are commanded by Generals Zygmunt Sadowski, of Poland, and William Carter, of the United States. The cost of the exercises, totaling 20 billion zlotys, will be borne by all of the participants in the maneuvers.

Pawlak at Opening Ceremony

LD1209153194 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1027 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Poznan, 12 Sep (PAP)—The first exercises under the Partnership for Peace program, code-named "Cooperative Bridge '94," began at the training ground in Biedrusko, near Poznan, today. Their purpose is to train troops for implementing tasks in UN peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions. For the Polish servicemen, it is a test of their ability to cooperate with international forces.

Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak arrived in Biedrusko for the opening of "Cooperative Bridge '94."

More than 900 soldiers from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Germany, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, the United States, Great Britain, and Italy are taking part in the five-day exercises. They are grouped in five international companies commanded by Americans, Britons, Germans, Poles, and Italians.

The same training cycle, under which the companies will exchange tasks, including exercises in setting up and protecting checkpoints, escorting personnel and equipment, and observing and patrolling, will be pursued every day.

The exercises are commanded by a headquarters made up of Polish and U.S. officers, under the leadership of Major General William G. Carter, commander of the U.S. 1st Armored Division, and Major General Zygmunt Sadowski, chief of staff of the Silesian Military District.

The exercises are taking part under the auspices of General George Joulwan, supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR), and are being implemented together with the Polish military authorities under the leadership of General Helge Hansen, commander in chief, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT).

'New Chapter'

LD1209131494 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1200 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Joint exercises of NATO and East European states are taking part at the training ground in Biedrusko, near Poznan, under the Partnership for Peace program. This is the first time these are taking place outside NATO territory.

[Correspondent Sebastian Podkoscielny] The exercise opening ceremony was attended by, among others, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, Senate Speaker Adam Struzik, Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk, and General George Joulwan, supreme allied commander of NATO forces in Europe.

These exercises are evidence of trust, cooperation, and solidarity between the states of NATO and of East-Central Europe, said Gen. Joulwan, opening the exercises. He added that they meant the opening of a new chapter in the history of the North Atlantic pact and Europe. The NATO chief for Europe appealed to the soldiers to be spokesmen of the vision of a peaceful Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk noted that the organization of the maneuvers in Poland showed that our country's efforts along the road to NATO had been noticed. He also expressed the hope that the Partnership for Peace program would ultimately lead us to membership of the pact.

This was Sebastian Podkoscielny, Radio News Agency.

Defense, GS Heads Comment

WS1209133394 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 12 Sep 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Stanislaw Lukaszewski: "Political Dimension of 'Cooperative Bridge 1994'; Press Conference of Defense Minister and General Staff Head of the Polish Army"]

[Text] "I will present to you," said National Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk on 9 September at a meeting with journalists, "the political foundation of the exercises called 'Cooperative Bridge 1994' and the hopes we pin on it; General Wilecki will handle the military side of things. It will be a division between politics and the military..." The minister voiced the hope that this principle, as a binding one, will become universal in the future.

"The exercises that will be held between 12 and 16 September in Biedrusk have," the head of the Ministry of National Defense [MON] pointed out, "a primarily political dimension. Their 'scope'—a typically military

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word—is not considerable. However, this is not important. It is important that soldiers of 13 states will meet in Poland for the first time within the framework of the 'Partnership for Peace' [PFP] program. We interpret this event as some recognition of our activeness in the implementation of the idea of the PFP. Our defense doctrine obliges us to become one of the equal members of the Western security structures; this doctrine specifies the time—until the end of the present century. Hence, our activeness, our great commitment, as well as the high speed we have imposed on ourselves.

"Our individual PFP program was approved as the first one. This happened as early as the first days of July this year. This was made possible by the long and, at the same time, coordinated work of representatives of the International Security Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Department of International Military Issues of MON, and the General Staff [GS] of the Polish Army, which made a substantial contribution in military contacts.

"It should be stressed that the scale of the exercises is not big; however, their significance is deep. It is a kind of laboratory of cooperation. We already must talk about quite a large international group. It is," as Minister Kolodziejczyk put it, " a small Babel tower. I am convinced," he stressed, "that these exercises will enable us to draw conclusions. Then it will also help us to plan subsequent exercises even better—the exercises that we will hold within the framework of the individual PFP program in 1995.

"At this point, I might speak," the minister said, "about our road, about our efforts, and, finally, about our ambitions. One could say a lot and do so for a long time. I am aware of the fact that you know quite a lot about this. Let us, then, accept the formula for satisfying your curiosity—that is, the convention of questions and answers."

Using this occasion, the minister announced that, between 19 and 23 September, in the Krakow Military District, a new military exercise will be held: "Tatry 1994." Participating in this exercise, apart from Polish land military units, will be a Danish mechanized platoon and a German air-and-landing company, which have been invited by MON. It is envisioned that the German soldiers will take part only in the third stage of the exercise, which will be a peace operation, consisting of separating units fighting against each other and monitoring the cease-fire.

"If you will let me say a few things," said Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki, "I will draw your attention to military issues. The methods and ways of performing tasks by subunits in the operational area of the mission of an international peacekeeping organization are the subject of these exercises. It will be the first training venture within the framework of the PFP with a great political meaning; the exercises will also be important from the standpoint of international cooperation in the area of implementing tasks by international peacekeeping forces."

For the Polish Army, these exercises are a kind of test of its organizational abilities in the area of cooperating in an international configuration. Gen. Wilecki listed the countries that are participating in the exercises and announced how many representatives they have sent. Some armies will be represented by companies, others by platoons. Some countries have delegated only observers and mediators. In all, 920 soldiers, including 280 soldiers of the Polish Army, will be participating in the exercises.

Gen. Wilecki discussed the organizational structure of the various subunits representing their states. The basic forces of the "Cooperative Bridge 1994" are five international companies, each consisting of four platoons. The commanders of each company come from different countries.

"It is envisioned," Gen. Wilecki stated, "that the costs of the exercises are covered by its participants. The overall sum will amount to approximately 20 billion zlotys."

Journalists were interested mainly in political references. They also wanted to know why Russia is not taking part in the exercises. The organizer of the "Cooperative Bridge 1994" is NATO, whereas Poland is merely the host. As it is known, invitations have been sent, but no reply came from Russia. General Brigadier Stanislaw Wozniak, head of the Foreign Military Affairs Department, who took part in the conference, answered the question of whether the list of the more important guests is already known. There is such a list, and it is very long. It is envisioned that as many as 150 to 200 important guests from the world of politics and the military will take part in the ceremonies (the opening and the closing of the exercises).

The opening ceremony will be held on 12 September at 1100 at the Biedrusk stadium.

Polish Naval Exercises Under Way in Baltic

LD1309110494 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0746 GMT 13 Sep 94

[Text] Szczecin, 13 Sep—In the framework of the "Pirania '94" naval exercises that are taking place in the western Baltic, ships and helicopters are today searching for a submarine that is hiding from them. This is the ORP [Ship of the Polish Republic] Orzel, Lieutenant Janusz Walczak, of the Navy Command, has reported.

About 40 fighting ships and auxiliary units are taking part in the exercises running from 12 to 16 September. More than 1,600 sailors and soldiers are participating, together with all branches of the air force.

The exercises are being led by Rear Admiral [Kontradmiral] Romuald Waga, the commander of the Navy of the Polish Republic.

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Olechowski: Russia's Fate 'Not Yet Decided'

AU1209194994 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 9 Sep 94 p 3

[Interview with Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski by Burkhard Bischof; place and date not given: "Russia's Fate Has Not Yet Been Decided"]

[Text] [Bischof] Foreign minister, one week ago the last Russian soldiers left eastern Germany and the Baltics. Is this withdrawal also of importance to Poland's security?

[Olechowski] The Russian withdrawal is of enormous historical importance. For us, the withdrawal from the Baltics, in particular, was a critical test of Russia's foreign policy. And the test produced very good results and has made us more optimistic about the objectives of Russian foreign policy.

[Bischof] You have repeatedly been critical that the policy of the Western world toward Central and East Europe was focusing too much on Russia. Has your criticism had any effect?

[Olechowski] I have not so much criticized the focus on Russia because this country does deserve much more attention. In several speeches, I compared the current situation to the situation after World War II, when the Allies were concentrating on the two defeated countries, Germany and Japan, in order to rebuild them and turn them into democratic societies. I proposed that people use this example as a guideline, which would require comprehensive and effective support for Russia. It would also be necessary to create room for Russia and to let it play its role in the world.

At the same time, I insisted that this place and this role are not conceded to just any kind of Russia but only to a Russia that is part of our world and shares our values and objectives: the world of democracy and human rights, the world in which the individual can achieve fulfillment. Our world is not one in which the size and power of a country comes before everything else, in which one country forces its interests upon other nations.

It is important to say this clearly. After all, despite the recent positive developments in Moscow's foreign policy, Russia's fate is not yet decided. We shudder at the thought that Russia might decide not to become part of our world but again become the center of its own separate world.

[Bischof] Do you have a recipe for preventing negative and threatening development in Russia?

[Olechowski] My recipe is classic: carrot and stick. The carrot should be the earlier mentioned comprehensive and efficient help and a readiness to integrate Russia. We were very glad that Russia was accepted into the circle of the G7 and that it concluded an agreement with the European Union. We would greatly support the conclusion of a program for the stabilization of the ruble. Yet, at the moment, the world is still very hesitant to commit big money.

On the other hand, one must be adamant in one's rejection of certain ways of conduct—for example, when Russia speaks of "near abroad" without defining what that means, or when Russia believes it has to raise major objections to Poland's ambition for membership in NATO or other Western security structures. That is not proper behavior.

[Bischof] How do you assess the political and economic situation of Poland's eastern neighbors Ukraine and Belarus?

[Olechowski] One does not want to see one's neighbors in such a desperate situation because it creates the soil for potential unrest and a wave of emigration. At the same time, we are losing a potentially great market through the economic misery there. What also worries us is the lack of world interest in these countries. That way, they have practically no alternatives. Europe has not made any attempt to suggest a certain place for these countries. For the average citizen in Ukraine or Belarus, there seems, therefore, to be no alternative to an institution of the kind of the former Soviet Union. We believe they deserve a better choice and better chances.

[Bischof] What is your assessment of Poland's current relationship with its other dominant and historically so determining neighbor, Germany?

[Olechowski] When you look at our opinion polls today, you find something historically quite extraordinary: A growing number of Poles are looking at their German neighbors with confidence and optimism. This offers us a great opportunity to build our relations on reconciliation and friendship. Our political leadership has, therefore, set itself the objective of achieving a friendly relationship between Poland and Germany comparable to that between those former archenemies Germany and France. These three countries are located on the bloodiest road of Europe. It was a road of horror, but we can turn it into a road of friendship.

[Bischof] Has Poland's participation in NATO's "Partnership for Peace" program so far fulfilled your expectations?

[Olechowski] As you know, we approached this program with great skepticism. In the end, we decided to accept NATO's partnership offer with confidence. For us, it is a useful process to adapt our armed forces and our defense system to NATO standards. Now we are waiting for the second step—namely, that NATO will really open up, that it will announce the criteria and a schedule for those who want to join. We insist that these criteria must identify those countries that are democratically mature enough and militarily suitable for membership.

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Foreign Minister on East Policy, CSCE, Trade

WS1209145694 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 10 Sep 94 p 4

[Interview with Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski, by Cezary Gmyz; place and date not given: "Reform in MSZ Is Not Delayed by Spitefulness of Other Ministers"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Gmyz] What are your relations with President Walesa like? They are said to have become a little cooler.

[Olechowski] I am still confident of the president's trust. Contacts with the president, which I value very much, are as frequent as the president's schedule allows them to be.

[Gmyz] Since 1989, every government has talked about the need to improve ur Eastern policy or, more specifically, to improve our relations with Russia. On the international arena, however, we are often against Russian proposals. For example, recently we were against the proposal concerning the future of the CSCE.

[Olechowski] During the CSCE session, I made a statement not really against the Russian proposal. I merely presented our point of view on the future of the CSCE, which differs from the Russian program. Incidentally, one of the people who considered it suitable to make a statement on our proposals was a Russian delegate.

Relations with Russia must be divided into political and economic relations. As for the former, we came across a barrier: lack of Russia's interest in the issues of Central Europe. Russia has a problem similar to ours: It is focusing on priority directions; it does not have enough steam for the rest. The Russians are seeking their place in such issues as G-7—that is, the group of the most important economies of the world, relations with the European Union, and, of course, they are making themselves comfortable on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The other barrier in political relations is emotions and resentments. To relieve them, we are now preparing a Polish-Russian working group; we want to get it moving as soon as this year. I pin many hopes on this initiative.

[Gmyz] What about economic relations with Russia?

[Olechowski] We hope we will soon host Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. We suppose that this visit will help settle a couple of issues—mainly, economic ones. We must be realistic and walk on the ground. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and we have submitted a number of programs. It may take a lot of time to make them more specific. However, most of them have already been discussed. Unfortunately, I must say that, regretfully, in the meantime, they lost a lot of their original attractiveness.

Officials decided that the programs cannot be called what I proposed—for example, "Wokulski." They said they should be called, for example, "Program for Supporting Exports to the Countries of..." and so on. [passage omitted]

[Gmyz] Upon his return from Brussels, Minister Kolodko stated that our integration with the European Union [EU] by the year 2000 is indeed likely. What does it look like from your point of view?

[Olechowski] The EU is now at the stage of a heated debate on its future. Until 1996, nothing will happen formally as far as our admission to the EU is concerned. Until that time, we will want to confirm the conviction that Poland is a future member of the organization, that in 1996 its road will be opened, and then the negotiations will begin.

[Gmyz] It seems that we are paying less and less attention to cooperation within the Visegrad Group, transferring our interest in the direction of the Weimar Triangle—that is, Poland, Germany, and France.

[Olechowski] These are two different issues. The Weimar Triangle is our window to EU. It is a program of three countries drawing closer to each other. These countries used to constitute the most bloody route in Europe, but today they may constitute a lasting route to friendship. The Visegrad Group is a regional association; it consists of countries having similar ambitions, and some of them believe that if they speak as one, their ambitions will be easier to hear. However, not everyone is looking at it this way. Therefore, because we do not want to spoil what has already been done, we will focus on economic issues. We will more and more often say CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Association], an agreement on free trade, and increasingly rarely the Visegrad Group. [passage omitted]

Scientists Reveal Use of Zacharski's Information

WS1209133894 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 10-11 Sep 94 p 3

[Article by Pawel Wronski: "What We Did With Zacharski's Captures; Safes of the Army"]

[Excerpt] Many documents obtained by Marian Zacharski are still in the armored safes of the scientists of the Military Technical Academy [WAT] and at armament institutes. Many of them have been utilized. All of them are protected by the secrecy clause.

"Early in the 1980's, we received an enormous amount of intelligence material from intelligence sources," says one WAT scientist. "Some of them even carried the signs of the U.S. factories from which they had come. Zacharski's informer William Bell cooperated with those plants. The materials were hidden in safes, and they were top secret."

Many technical descriptions were given to the WAT Quantum Electronics Institute, where a team headed by Professor Zbigniew Puzewicz worked out the "Merida"

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laser-fire directing system. Polish laser technology was then leading in the world. Prof. Puzewicz designed, among other things, one of the first lasers and a laser lancet. He says that the materials that were handed over to the institute helped them a lot.

The Poles then created their own fire directing system called "Merida," which they installed in T-55 tanks. "We did not know, however, whether we were going in the right direction. The intelligence materials made us certain about this," says Puzewicz. "It saved us a huge amount of money."

At that time, the entire Warsaw Pact was using an analogue data-processing system; Poles decided on a digital system. In those times, laser systems were still underestimated.

"The Russians gave us insight into much older technologies," says one scientist. "In the beginning, we also presented old things to them. Then there was no great friendship, and everyone was acting on his own. When 'Merida' was worked out, it turned out that one tank destroyed five other tanks within just one minute."

"Merida" was hailed as the best system in the Warsaw Pact. It was not sold to anyone.

Thanks to Zacharski, our experts obtained earlier than the Soviet Union the technical description of the Stinger rocket—the nightmare of Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan. "The Russians bought several Stingers from the Mojahedin; however, they were not able to figure out how they worked. We knew everything about them," says one scientist. This is why the new Polish ground-air rocket is free of the shortcomings the Stinger had.

Recently, Russia officially announced that it has radar capable of detecting the invisible Stealth bomber planes. Poles probably have similar radar that penetrates the "invisible" paint of the bomber plane—thanks to Zacharski. Now we are taking advantage of the material he obtained in working on a new antiaircraft rocket.

None of the scientists are able to say how much of what Zacharski intercepted found its way to the Soviet Union. "We did not need the technology of the Patriot rockets and invisible fighter planes," explained one of them. "I do not know what the intelligence forces did with it, nor can I asses this. We worked for Poland." [passage omitted]

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Melescanu, Moldova's Popov Hold 'Sincere' Talks

AU1309062694 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Today in Bucharest the foreign ministers of Romania and the Republic of Moldova, Teodor Melescanu and Mihai Popov, held two rounds of official talks which lasted for about three and a half hours. During the talks they approached, in an open and sincere way, various aspects of the relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The talks outlined the special, priority, and privileged nature of the bilateral ties, the fundamental goal of which is to deepen economic integration and strengthen the joint cultural and spiritual area.

Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu highlighted the fact that the ties between the two independent Romanian states are based on their ethnic, linguistic, historic, cultural, and traditional unity, this being the basis for Romania's having immediately recognized the independence of the Republic of Moldova on 17 August 1991, as well as for the continuous support granted to it by Romania for the international assertion of the Republic of Moldova as a sovereign and independent state.

According to our reporters, Romania's foreign minister stressed the determination of our country's government to go on supporting the Republic of Moldova in the efforts it is making to overcome the difficulties that are specific for the transition period, the aggravated situation in agriculture caused by natural calamities this year.

Minister Mihai Popov expressed the thanks of the Government of the Republic of Moldova for this support and emphasized the quickness and efficiency by which the Romanian central and local authorities acted and are acting for the curbing of the negative effects of the drought and recent floods.

During the seond round of their consultations they reviewed a series of issues of joint interest, especially on the regionqal and European planes. The two parties emphasized the role of the two foreign ministries in the promotion of the relations, on the bilateral and international planes, between Romania and the Republic of Moldova.

Gherman, Moldova's Foreign Minister Discuss Ties

AU1209180994 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Mr. Oliviu Gherman, president of the Senate, received a delegation from the Republic of Moldova led by Foreign Minister Mihai Popov at the Senate headquarters today. Mr. Oliviu Gherman said that Foreign Minister Popov's visit marks a particularly important point in the evolution of relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The Senate president also said that the evolution of the ties between the two countries has had its ups and downs, but the negative elements have often been exaggerated.

In his turn, Foreign Minister Mihai Popov emphasized that his visit to Romania is a confirmation of the fact that the relations between the two countries have not cooled down. He also said that one should continue the path of political dialogue, which can eliminate suspicions.

Mihai Popov invited Mr. Oliviu Gherman to visit the Republic of Moldova, on behalf of the president of the Chisinau Parliament. According to our correspondent Dan Preda, the press had no access to the last part of their meeting, which lasted for almost one hour.

Smugglers Caught With Warheads for Bosnian Serbs

AU1209153194 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 10 Sep 94 p 2

[Eugen Coifan signed report: They Established the Origins of the Smuggled Warheads—The Merchandise Confiscated From the Turnu Severin Smugglers Is Romanian-Made"]

[Text] As reported in our daily's yesterday issue, two members of an air-to-ground missile warhead-smuggling gang (Dumitru Ciurel, age 41, vice mayor of the village of Malovat, Mehedinti County, and Gheorghe Ciobanu, aged 39, of the town of Turnu Severin, repairman at the local gas station PECO) were seized near Turnu Severin by the Mehedinti County Police Inspectorate's Squad for Fighting Organized Crime.

As a result of our own investigations (because the investigating bodies have imposed an almost full news embargo regarding the case), we discovered that the two traffickers tried to sell, by means of intermediate persons, 11 air-to-ground missile warheads to certain Serb citizens. This would have been the first batch of a deal totalling 50 warheads intended for the army of the Bosnian Serbs.

The transaction was planned to take place in a previously established location situated between the town of Turnu Severin and the Iron Gates I customs office. The go-between (who might have been a police informer) showed up at the established time and place with 300,000 (German) marks in cash.

The traffickers had the 11 warheads hidden in the trunk of their automobile. The moment the deal was almost concluded, the policemen who had been hiding in the bushes in the area appeared with their guns drawn, warning them to surrender. One of the traffickers who tried to flee was shot in the leg. The authorities, however, have not confirmed this incident (his having been shot). After having been captured the two Romanian citizens have been questioned and an arrest warrant was issued against them on 8 September. Owing to the fact that the

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traffickers' network is a widespread one, the investigation has been expanded over the whole country.

Despite the fact that in the beginning the police did not know the origin of the air-to-ground missile warheads, we recently learned that they are Romanian-made. For national security reasons, the sole information we can pass on to our readers is the fact that such type of ammunition is currently being manufactured in Romania.

Iliescu Interviewed on Socioeconomic Development

AU1309112694 Bucharest DIMINEATA Supplement in Romanian pp 1-4 30 Aug 94

[Interview with Romanian President Ion Iliescu by Rudi Vranckx of the Belgische Radio en Televisie (RTBN) and Alain de Streel of the Radio-Television Belge de la Commonaute Francaise (RTBF); place and date not given: "Romanian Society Has To Transform Itself Unaided With the Participation of All Human Resources Available"]

[Excerpts] [RTBN-RTBF] Mr. President, in your opinion, what has changed over the past four-five years in post-revolutionary Romania?

[Iliescu] A great deal of things, I believe. All the changes that occurred over that period may by assessed on the basis of the Proclamation of the Romanian Revolution, the 22 December 1989 Proclamation. [passage omitted]

[RTBN-RTBF] The opposition claims that nothing has really changed, that, practically the same persons are holding power, and that economic power remains in the hands of the former nomenklatura. What is you answer to such objections?

[Iliescu] It is the duty of all opposition to criticize things. That is only normal. Whenever they do not possess normal, correct grounds, they come up with various slogans, in connection with the nomenklatura, the former communists, and so on. But which member of the former nomenklatura, of the former party and state leadership occupies important offices today? The person to whom they all mean is Iliescu, myself. However, Iliescu—me, a former member of the communist party who held office in its central bodies even though they were quite limited positions, one should say that too—was pushed aside and eliminated from the leadership in 1971 because of altercations he had at that time with Ceausescu on basic policy issues.

Comparing Romania with other countries and the processes going on nowadays, one has to point out that Romania was in the forefront in the processes in the early sixties, something which became possible because of the Soviet troop pullout in 1958. Romania was the only country which managed to obtain such a thing from Khrushchev. Khrushchev never made the same mistake again, on the contrary, he occupied Czechoslovakia; actually it wasn't him. He intervened in Hungary and strengthened their control; he wanted to place the economies of these countries under their control. Romania was the sole country which rose against such Soviet tendencies to subordinate the economies of the so-called socialist countries to the interests of the Soviet economy. That was the main idea behind CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance].

Romania's stand was well known. At that time everyone applauded Romania's policy. Romania opposed intervention in Czechoslovakia. In 1967 an open discussion was initiated in Romania to discuss the need for economic reform; we were talking about markets, about the need to combine planned economy with the laws of the markets. Such discussions were solely in Romania and Czechoslovakia. In Czechoslovakia, at the National Planning Council, Ota Sik and his team were working on economic reforms: That was the principal theoretical basis of the "Prague Spring." Romania was heading along the same currents, it was sharing their views regarding the principal issues of the need to modernize its economy on the basis of the principles of market economics.

There was a great deal of opening in that period; the opening toward the West to promote certain forms of cooperation in production and many ties in the field of technology, joint ventures with French, British, and German companies in certain areas of industrial production. The idea of management was introduced. They organized, in the late sixties, courses, and later on they even set up a central institution for the training of cadres and industrial managers. Computer science and technology was also introduced and Romania was a forerunner in the promotion of that process. There was cooperation, especially with the French, to promote the production of computers and related equipment. There was a general opening and even discussion on the political plane regarding the reform plans. There was an opening. This lasted until the intervention in Czechoslovakia. After Czechoslovakia there was a turnabout to a primitive conception with a totalitarian state and a personal dictatorship.

In 1971, after Ceausescu's visit in China, North Korea, and Vietnam I had discussions with him on these issues. To his mind, North Korea was the example of the efficient state because everything was kept under control. I told him it was the model of an inhuman society and therefore it could not be accepted as a model for socialist states we had just proclaimed in those times, with a free system, which was expected to promote the values and the initiative of the people; it was just the opposite of that. That was the moment when the rift between us occurred.

All these slogans about the former nomenklatura—we all lived in the same system; so with whom should we transform our society? Where could we possibly find people who were not part of that system? If we imported people from other places, could they understand the

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people here? Could they comprehend Romanian society? Would they be able to achieve the transformation? Romanian society has to transform itself unaided with the participation of all the human resources it has—and it does have such resources. One of Romania's advantages is its human capital. Even the period of primitive socialist accumulation, within a totalitarian system, was for Romania a period in which a primitive accumulation of capital took place, within a so-called socialist framework.

Compared to other countries in this region, immediately after the war Romania used to be a predominantly agricultural country. The life of the majority of the population—80 percent of it—was related to agriculture, which was state-owned. One third of the population was illiterate. Then industry was developed. An economic infrastructure was created and education, in general, was developed. This is an asset achieved in that period: the general education and training of people; I believe this is an important potential one can rely on. Of course, in a different system, within a different framework, we could have made even greater progress. As an example we could take Czechoslovakia, which before the war used to be a developed country, it used to be the industrial center of the former Austro-Hungarian empire. Between the two world wars Czechoslovakia used to be one of the most developed countries of Europe, surpassing even Belgium, France, or Germany, as far as industrial economic potential. Even in the period of so-called socialism Czechoslovakia was structured economically in a different way; I use the term so-called socialism, because I consider it a system of domination by the state that had nothing to do with the principles of modern socialism currently existing in the world.

[RTBN-RTBF] Now for a question regarding developing the country. You said that Romania had to develop using only its own forces, as there were no other forces available. Now, after five years—I was here five years ago—I have the impression that a change has occurred and there is a conflict between generations. Now there is a new generation, which is ready to play its own role. Romania's problem is a generational conflict. The new generation wishes to make its own changes and to seize power, to take it in its own hands.

[Iliescu] I do not think it is a generational conflict. Of course, that problem has always existed, and people have always had that ability of not hanging on too much to the inertia of the existing systems, of the way of thinking. That is a virtue and, naturally, the younger generation will take the torch from us and ensure future progress. However, as always in the history of mankind, there will be a combination between youth and experience, belonging to the older generation; besides, one will always find conservative people among the young as well, in the same way as one can find very open-minded and very receptive people among the old, people who will promote progress. This quite sectarian, but also short-sighted and shocking way of separating people according to their age is actually counter-productive.

[RTBN-RTBF] Still, owing to the fact that in Romania Ceausescu's regime used to be so strict that all generations were kept under its control, now hope should come from the young, because they are different.

[Iliescu] Yes, from that point of view you are right. However, this is not only valid for the current period, but rather for all periods in the history of mankind. Young people are less biased, their mental inertia is reduced. Sometimes it is precisely education that introduces certain amount of rigidness in our way of thinking, because we all bear the marks of our intellectual and mental training. There are always more young people among the innovators, who do not feel restricted in their way of thinking and the stances they take and who are more courageous to open new perspectives and new ways. Of course, the young generation represents one of the advantages we have. And I have already mentioned the human factor, as the principal source, perhaps, of our progress, for surmounting the difficulties of the current transition period. This intellectual ability of the new generation in Romania because—as contrary to the situation immediately following the war, when general education was limited to four grades and people who could graduate eight grades, not to mention high-schools or universities, used to represent a minority—today we have a young generation with a general education of ten grades and among whom high-school and university graduates are to be found quite frequently. It is one of the virtues of our young that they are open-minded not solely because of their being young, but also because of the knowledge they acquired.

[RTBN-RTBF] Is the older generation prepared to surrender power to the younger one?

[Iliescu] Your question sounds as if you were considering the generations as representing compact structures. This issue goes beyond generations. Old structures have always had certain inertia and this always represented a barrier; such inertia has always penetrated structures, institutions, and especially the people's way of thinking. The same inertial factors may exist in the case of 20-years olds, as well as in the case of 60- or 70-year olds. It is not just a matter of one's age. If, for instance, one considers the political aptitudes of the people, I can tell you that there is no alternative for Romania, as during the last elections, let me mention the elections, why did the Romanians elect Iliescu, an old communist? All six candidates for the presidency were old communists. Even Professor Emil Constantinescu, chairman of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] and current rector of Bucharest University, was a member of the party committee at the university. They had no chance to elect a noncommunist person as Romania's president.

[RTBN-RTBF] It is precisely Professor Constantinescu who told us about the "democratorship" ["democratura"], which is a term composed of the words democracy [democratie] and dictatorship [dictatura]. Would you like to comment on that?

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[Iliescu] One could coin many terms like that, but they would all refer to the birth of the new state and social structures. That is not a thing which may be solved within a short time. However, I believe that the accumulation that has already taken place already represents a potential for the further general opening of Romanian society. Nevertheless, the political struggle is to continue, that is one of the virtues of a democracy.

[RTBN-RTBF] Do you consider that Romania needs stronghanded leadership?

[Iliescu] Not stronghanded leadership, but it does need more authoritativeness; especially at times when dramatic changes take place. I believe any modern state needs its institutions to be authoritarian to a certain extent, for instance the institutions that ensure observance of the law—because, above all, democracy means laws and the observance of laws. There should be institutions bestowed with sufficient authority to impose laws. I believe it was Jacques Chirac who once said that democracy begins with "people's respect for the police officers," that is, for the law and the institutions ensuring the observance of the law. From that point of view, the authorities in our country are quite weak; it is one of the consequences of the 1989 revolution, which wiped out the old structures of the state.

For a while we worked with provisional structures, and now we have created new ones, new institutions, and a new system of laws. But the state authority used to be weak to a certain extent. In 1990 I was blamed, perhaps you remember, of the "miners' incursions"—that Iliescu had manipulated the miners, he had called them to Bucharest! In order to manipulate everything and everyone, Iliescu would have had to be a genuine "superman!" That was an overestimation of Iliescu's power to fascinate people or of God knows what other instrument of Iliescu's, to believe that he was able to perform such maneuvers. Actually it was nothing else but an overflow of the impulses of the masses, which happened at a time when there did not exist any state authority able to protect legal order. It was the period following the first general elections in May 1990. There was a certain electoral rally of the opposition parties going on in University Square, which was joined by a combination of all kind of people. Over two months they were holding a permanent rally, day and night, in University Square. One could say that it was some sort of electoral campaign. However, at that time it did not help the opposition forces, because people were upset by the very violent and aggressive stance and language they used in University Square, and I believe that the opposition lost many votes owing to that rally in the 1990 elections. However, after the elections we already had an elected legislature and a new, elected president. Why did they go on with their rally? One could see a certain amount of inertia apparent, which kept dragging on. The legislature had to begin its session, so the police tried to clear that important traffic knot in Bucharest. However, this triggered a reaction that impressed everyone, because it was a profascist spout, the police were aggressed, cars were set ablaze, and they stormed police headquarters, the Interior Ministry headquarters, and the television building. That is when the people reacted in self-defense. I addressed the population—the way De Gaulle did in 1968, when similar events were taking place in France—asking them to defend democracy, which had just been born, and the results of the elections. However, my appeal was addressed to the Bucharesters, to defend themselves, as the police were unable to restore order in the city. Nevertheless, other people came as well. A group of miners came; they were well-intended and meant to support order against the anarchists; however, they also committed excesses. In the end Iliescu was accused of having used the miners to crush the opposition rally. What rally? That was no rally at all! The opposition was already organized, it was represented in the provisional legislature, it had been elected to the new legislature. The new legislature had to hold its constituent session. Why should the state authority, which had won the elections, want to cause disorder? That is not logical. But logical thinking does not count very much when certain mass media campaigns are conducted to distort reality.

From this point of view, of course, democracy needs a certain amount of authoritativeness, which should be set up, and it is difficult for us to erect such authoritativeness to defend the law not against the people and their liberties, but, on the contrary, rather to be able to vouch for the security of people and society.

[BRTN-RTBF] Currently, you represent this authority, until the structures are solidly established.

[Iliescu] Yes, I do, as a guarantor of the Constitution. However, the presidency is an institution with limited duties. The president in Romania is not like in Germany or Italy, where he is elected by the legislature and has only representational duties. However, he is less powerful than in France, where the president can chair government meetings.

In Romania, the president is something in between these two. He is elected through general elections, not by the legislature. He is in contact with the legislature, with the government, and with the judiciary and is a mediating factor between these three representatives of power and between them and society. From this viewpoint he has his duty and responsibilities but also his limits. He has to rely on the current state structures and the state institutions.

[BRTN-RTBF] What do you think is the greatest danger threatening Romania?

[Iliescu] On a domestic plane, as I have often mentioned, our major problems are economic ones. On the one hand, we have planned to stabilize this process of economic reform and establish all the structures, institutions, and mechanisms of a normally developed market economy. On the other, we wish to get integrated in the European process and in the world economy in a most

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effective manner, and, at the same time, to ensure a certain social protection of our citizens. We have proposed to ensure the normalization of economic activity, but the sources available to the national economy are limited, meaning that there are limitations in finding solutions to social problems.

Currently, the social consequences of the transition phase represent the most delicate problems for us and also represent the major problem for the government and legislature. The solution is to actively promote the necessary legislation for this process and ensure a sustained dynamism to revive and relaunch our national economy. In this respect, I believe that it does not matter what the government structure is or which is the political force responsible for the government's policy, reform is the only policy to be promoted. There will always be nuances and differences in the manner in which this policy will be promoted, but there is no other way out.

Today, we have perhaps three things that pressure us: A certain nostalgia for the recent past, for the centralized economic system—many people see in this relative anarchy in economy a shortfall of this period and believe that maybe it is better for us to return to the old structures, to a state system that can control processes. This is a utopia. We cannot return to such practices. In Romania's case, we can no longer have a centralized state that controls the economy. A certain type of state control and an autarkical economy might be conceivable in two or three countries in the world, but not in Romania. This might be plausible for Russia and for China. However, it is inconceivable for the United States because it dominates the world economy and has no interest whatsoever in isolating themselves. For Russia, it might be likely, but even for that country, a process of openness toward the world economy has begun, because Russia has paid dearly for its isolation, which was one of the factors that led to the failure of the economic system. Even China has started to open up to the world. Thus, how could it be possible for such a country like Romania? The centralized state system could exist at a regional and smaller international scale in which the Romanian economy was also integrated. However, for the current period this is a complete utopia. And these feelings of nostalgia do not exclusively occur on a psychological plane, because simple people can also see the difference. It was not good in the old system of oppression, however, people's lives and their jobs were secure.

There are other people who experience nostalgia as well, who are looking at Romania the way it was before the war. Those are the representatives of people who formerly enjoyed all the advantages, representatives of the dominant classes, who had all the advantages before the war and believed that this overthrow of the communist system should turn Romania back to the practices and structures that prevailed before the war. This is another utopia, and an ever more serious one. We are at the end of the 20th century and we should look ahead, toward the processes that take place on our continent and in the world economy, and should look at the whole civilization.

There is also another type of pressure, from people who are "in a hurry" and who wish to get rich quickly by making use of and profiting from this quite hazy period. This is the source of the process of corruption, tax evasion, and accumulation of wealth without work which is a very active phenomenon, with highly negative consequences.

We must wage our fight on three fronts against all these three types of pressure and assert, as you said before, a new way of thinking, the thinking of the new generation. We should rely on those who look ahead and not on those who look back.

[BRTN-RTBF] This is a very beautiful conclusion.

[Iliescu] Have you had talks with other politicians as well?

[BRTN-RTBF] Yes. With Mr. Emiliescu Constantinescu [Democratic Convention of Romania president] and Mr. Petre Roman [Democratic Party-National Salvation Front president]. We also talked with people in the street.

[Iliescu] Have you been to Romania before?

[BRTN-RTBF] Yes, in 1989 during the revolution and during the 1990 and 1991 elections.

[Iliescu] And what is your opinion of the situation?

[BRTN-RTBF] What I said about young people and about the new mentality. In 1990 we saw students in University Square in Bucharest. They were tougher then. Today they are more hesitant but more mature. This is normal. However, I have the impression that now Romania is ready to make a new leap forward. Perhaps there will be changes next year, but other kinds of social, economic, and political changes.

[Iliescu] The process in Romania is of a special nature. Others, the Czechs for example, certainly had another starting point. The situation was different even before that. They went through the so-called "velvet revolution" something that was possible only in Czechoslovakia, with a more balanced society, better trained people, and a more solid and more reasonable economic basis. But even in Czechoslovakia there was a slow process. They did not succeed in preserving the unity of their state. A disparity emerged between Czechia, which was more advanced, and Slovakia, which was a less developed area. Then, this structure that seemed pretty solid between the two world wars and after the war, broke after the collapse of the communist regime. The same in the case of Yugoslavia. This was maybe the most significant example of a courageous and heroic people who resisted the German occupation. Whereas France was overrun by the Germans in two weeks, the Yugoslav people put up the most effective resistance.

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[BRTN-RTBF] That was mainly the mentality of the Serbs.

[Iliescu] Yes. They resisted Stalin's pressure and there were no internal divisions. I visited Yugoslavia a couple of times. The first time was in 1947. Then I travelled throughout Yugoslavia and Bosnia, on my way to Albania to work at a work site. There was no difference between Serbs and Croats. What are the Muslims in Bosnia? Croatians who took up the Islamic religion during the Ottoman occupation.

[BRTN-RTBF] Aren't they true Muslims?!

[Iliescu] The Serbs and Croats are in reality the same people. But they were separated by history: the Austrian occupation on the one hand and the Muslim occupation on the other hand. Some of them use the Latin alphabet, others the Cyrillic alphabet. The Croats became Catholics, the Serbs remained Orthodox. There is no ethnic war in Bosnia but a confessional conflict between Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims.

[BRTN-RTBF] This can be seen everywhere in the Balkans.

[Iliescu] Yes. But this society and this state, which seemed pretty solid, which was established after World War II and resisted the Soviet Stalinist pressure, has now collapsed.

In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev's generation launched the idea of "perestroika." The political thinking of that generation was the basis for this idea and I believe that the pressure of the military assisted this opening.

[BRTN-RTBF] It is often said that you belong to Gorbachev's generation and that you had the same way of thinking and the same attitude of openness at the beginning.

[Iliescu] Yes. He remains Russian and I am Romanian. However, the only field where the Soviets were competitive was the military area. They were competing with the Americans and talking to them as equals. They felt that they were going to lose this competition. That was a special period when dynamism characterized technological progress and they could no longer stand up to the competition with the Americans. That is why they started that process of analysis, to find out why and where the barrier arose which had to be overcome in order to enhance the technological process. There was even a theory circulating that in a socialist state, where the state has complete control of everything, where there is a confluence of interests—individual, private, and social interests—and where all resources of society, such as material, financial, and human resources are directed, planned, and utilized, must be more efficient than a capitalist system with its chaos, with the competition that perforce diminishes its effectiveness. But things were exactly the opposite. The question was: why? This is the reason for examining the source of this obstruction or barrier in the path of technological progress. The conclusion was that the economic system is in a state of inertia and the bureaucracy and a super-centralized economy of great dimensions are stumbling blocks. Then, the idea of "perestroika" was launched. However, when they came up with the idea to revive and rebuild the economy, they quickly realized the role of the political system. The economy was controlled by political factors, thus, it was necessary to reform the political system.

When the idea of reforming the political system came up, not only the process of "glasnost", that is, social criticism, appeared—which was only the beginning—but more serious problems emerged as well, namely, the party monopoly had to be eliminated. Gorbachev did not understand this, the national problem. The Soviet Union was the last colonial empire still standing; it should have been eliminated after World War I. The process had started, but the establishment of the Soviet Union was the act that preserved this empire. Gorbachev did not understand the need to demolish the empire or to ensure the independence of Soviet republics. This triggered a process that aggravated the entire situation. In the beginning it was a slower process, coming from within and initiated by the political leadership of the country. This process should have led to restructuring but, instead, it triggered a process that could no longer be controlled.

In Romania the situation was the complete reverse. The system was more rigid and tougher. Ceausescu did not even agree to discuss the idea of a need for change. He believed that his system was the best, that it was ideal. It was impossible to talk to him about it. However, the rising tension was similar to the situation in other countries. Ceausescu made an effort to eliminate foreign debts, to ensure—as he said—economic independence in order to guarantee political independence. But what kind of economic independence was there when he built an industry based on primitive principles and concepts such as those of Stalin, according to which industrialization means heavy industry and the machine building industry, which depend on raw materials and energy resources from abroad. Thus, Romania boasted of metallurgy with a capacity of 15 million metric tons while Sweden, a country with a longstanding tradition in the field of metallurgy, was producing 6 million metric tons of steel in the 50's and today still produces 5-6 million tons. It did not make quantitative but qualitative changes. Ceausescu had this view of industrialization, but Romania has no iron ore, other kinds of raw materials, or energy sources. He developed a big industry that was a big energy and raw material consumer. Those resources, such as oil and others, came from abroad, mainly from the Soviet Union and Arab countries. His idea of economic independence and a kind of autarchy was in direct contrast to the industrial structure he had built. His measures to forcibly eliminate the country's debts aggravated internal tensions because they put pressure on people's living conditions. He intensively exported products that were vital for the population.

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There was a complete lack of basic foodstuffs. He imposed a limit on imports, a measure that had negative consequences on technological renewal. In the 60's and 70's, great efforts were made to develop new technologies, and in the 80's, even strictly necessary imports to service existing equipment were cut. All these things created major disruptions from every viewpoint and an accumulation of internal tensions characterized this system.

The only solution was to start a popular revolution such as the Romanian revolution of December 1989, with the immediate overthrow of the entire state structure. What some people say about nothing having changed is not correct. The elimination of all these structures: party, government, and national assembly, began on the night of 22 December 1989, and new formations were instated that were established then, on the spot, with those who were present and assumed the risks of facing the situation. Thus, the National Salvation Front Council [CFSN] was established at a central level and later, everywhere, in institutions and enterprises with the people who were present there. It was total improvisation. But for people who followed the December events closely, when complete autarchy and chaos began, one could see that autarchy, total chaos in society with uncontrollable phenomena, vindictive acts, crime, and civil war might follow. There were losses but, nevertheless, in a few days we succeeded in getting the situation under control. The Army was the major support in the process of restructuring certain state institutions and ensuring development, then the CFSN assumed the more active role. We created a structure on which we could rely for our further progress.

Today, we can see the difference between the situation and the element of violence at the beginning, which continued through to the 1990 University Square events, the miners' incursion, and other events, and the current political and economic situation. Today we use another language, there is another climate prevailing here. All this street confrontation has moved to the parliament and the press where a more colorful and rougher language is being used, but which is to preferred over anarchical street confrontations. This is already a step forward and we hope to consolidate a new opening, based on fundamental solutions in economics and society.

Ethnic Hungarians State Position on Treaty

AU1209132694 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 3 Sep 94 p 3

[MTI report: "RMDSZ Position on the Romanian-Hungarian Basic Treaty"]

[Text] The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian] published its position on the Romanian- Hungarian basic treaty yesterday, the text of which was sent to Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs on 29 August and to Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu on 2 September.

The document points out that the RMDSZ finds it basically important for the governments and the legislatures of the two countries to include the legitimate representatives of Hungarians in Romania and Romanians in Hungary in negotiating agreements on good-neighborly relations. The basic treaty should contain an agreement on protecting minorities that takes into consideration the rights formulated by the legitimate organizations of Hungarians in Romania and Romanians in Hungary, including the list of demands drawn up by these organizations.

The RMDSZ regards as the principled basis of minority protection measures the active role of national minorities in developing good- neighborly relations and in promoting European integration, the individual historical traditions of indigenous minorities and the relevant institutional forms, the ethnic, cultural, religious, and language particularities, including the preservation of these particularities, international human rights, the freedom right, and minority protection documents, and the forms of autonomy existing in some countries in Europe, including Romania's responsibility deriving from the Declaration of Gyulafehervar [Alba Julia] in 1918 and the subsequent treaty protecting minorities following World War II.

The document provides a detailed list of the rights and human rights of the minorities living in the two countries, and the RMDSZ expects the two sides to accept obligations regarding these rights. This includes the protection of national identity, autonomous decision-making mechanisms, the implementation of these decisions by their own system of institutions, the acknowledgment of personal rights and the right to local self-government and regional autonomy of the ethnic Hungarian minority in Romania, a special legal status for the elected local authorities in places where the Hungarian minority is in a majority, the right to study in one's mother tongue at all levels of education, and the use of one's mother tongue in the private and public life.

These 12 points are supplemented by another list of issues to be solved immediately through government measures, like the return of real estate and other property confiscated from the religious denominations and various associations of ethnic Hungarians after 1945, the restoration of the Bolyai University, the naturalization of diplomas obtained abroad, and the use of Hungarian signs for the name of communities, streets, and institutions in places where ethnic Hungarians make up at least 10 percent of the overall population.

The RMDSZ position calls for adequate guarantees through legislation, the ratification of international agreements, the appointment of a national minority commissioner, and the support of the CSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities.

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Federation President on Problems, Progress

AU1209165094 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Sep 94 pp 5-6

[Interview with President of Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Kresimir Zubak by Veso Vegar; place and date not given: "There Will Not Be Another Muslim-Croat Conflict"]

[Text] It has become more than obvious that the process of implementing the Washington Agreement made by the Croats and Bosniak Muslims on the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is running very late. Since the first steps, such as adopting the Federation Constitution, and appointing the top federation officials and the Federal Government, there has not been much progress. One most often hears the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats reproached for their tardiness, even for hindering the implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Constitution, and such accusations mostly come from the Bosniaks. We talked to Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and president of the presidential council of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna, after he and the leadership of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna had received an audience with the President of the Republic of Croatia Franjo Tudjman, at which they mostly discussed problems and the rate of implementation of the Washington Agreement.

[Vegar] What is the cause of the standstill in the implementation of Washington and Vienna Agreements between the Croats and the Bosniak-Muslims?

[Zubak] It is obvious that we have not taken every possible measure immediately after the signing of the Washington Agreements and adopting the Federation Constitution, which were meant to implement the Constitution. So far we have only appointed the president and vice president of the federation, and government ministers and their deputies. Since then, there has been a standstill in the process of developing bodies of authorities, which are the prerequisite for making the federation function. There are several reasons for this. First of all, those of us in charge of this job have been absent too often. We have been involved in many negotiations with international protagonists. On the other hand, I think that the two parties, the Croatian Democratic Community and the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], that represent the political will of the Croats and the Bosniak-Muslims have not reached a valid agreement on this, that is, they have not reached a political agreement. Actually, further implementation of the Federation Constitution is conditional upon the two parties coming to such an agreement.

Aware of this, Mr. Ganic [Federation vice president] and I have initiated an program to speed up the implementation of the Constitution. Our plan is to initiate a procedure to appoint judges to the Constitutional Court and to establish municipal and cantonal authorities. To that end, we formed certain bodies which are supposed to govern and stimulate activities on those levels with the purpose of establishing contacts between the two nations and to form the authorities in accordance with the 1990 election results.

We are now trying to speed up this process. However, to be honest, our opinions differ on the implementation of the Federation Constitution and its realization in practice. Particularly in view of the circumstances on the ground and the functioning of the authorities of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna, which, in the transition regulations of the Constitutions, are defined as an administration to function until all the federation authorities are fully established.

It is my opinion that, for the time being, the forming of all the bodies of authority—from the government, the reconstruction of jurisdiction, the forming of judicial bodies of the Federation and their officials—is the main problem. At this point there are already many problems in interpreting the Federation Constitution and the Federal Constitutional Court is the only body competent to answer these questions.

"Shortage" of Croats Everywhere

[Vegar] Has the Consitutional Court been established?

[Zubak] To that end, I wrote to the International Court of Justice in The Hague asking them to appoint members of that court to the Constitutional Court, for the Constitution says that, in the first five years, the president of the International Court of Justice will appoint his own men. My information is that a list of candidates has been sent and it is now up to the Croats and the Bosniaks to put up their candidates and another two candidates to represent the other nations. With regard to the government, we are insisting that all the posts in the ministries be filled, first of all the leading ones, especially as our data unequivocally point to the fact that there are hardly any Croats holding those offices. For instance, out of more than 1,000 people working for the government and the ministries, there are fewer than 10 percent Croats, especially as deputies and other leading positions. In the Ministry of Internal Affairs, out of 550 employees, there are only 22 Croats, only one of whom is in a leading position and he is in charge of fire prevention. In the Defense Ministry, except for the minister, there is no other Croat holding a leading office. Things are equally bad in the education department. There is only one Croat in the Ministry for Refugees and Welfare. All this shows that we must concentrate all our efforts on composing the government in accordance with the agreement.

[Vegar] Is there deliberate and open resistance on the part of Bosniak-Muslim officials?

[Zubak] Yes, of course. On part of those who want to preserve the present situation and change nothing. Some think that they should nominate Croatian candidates for those functions. Furthermore, let me point out that we

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have specific information and documents to corroborate this. For instance, in the Finance Ministry one lower level Bosniak official circulated a memorandum to all employees that every document and every bill, even if signed by the minister himself, who happens to be a Croat, is not valid without his approval. This shows that the process of the implementation is not so easily done in practice and that there will be more resistance. We know that some Bosniak leaders think that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is superior to the federation. On the other hand, some think that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is just a stage before the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic is reestablished as it once was. We are aware of all of this and we will insist on a consistent implementation of the Constitution. There will be some resistance but we are determined to proceed. "We" means representatives of the Croats. If we cannot do that by referring to arguments, facts, and the spirit of the agreement, we will apply other methods. In the first stage, we will ask those who mediated in the reaching of the agreement, and not for the sake of arbitration, to help us. I have in mind principally the United States, Germany, and Turkey. I think that the activity of the Constitutional Court will contribute to a proper interpretation of the Constitution and that it will prevent political and every other kind of willfulness in interpreting the Constitution by some Bosniak leaders and especially some local potentates.

KOS [Counterintelligence Service] Is Still Active

[Vegar] Do you think that the mediators put pressure on the Croats and the Bosniaks to sign the agreement and then left it all up to the two sides? What is their relationship toward the federation?

[Zubak] Let me first tell you that they no longer exert pressure on the implementation of the agreement, for reaching the agreement on all of Bosnia-Herzegovina is more important for them. They think that it is important, and that it is a big step forward that there is no longer any conflict between the Croats and the Bosniaks. Naturally, that is the biggest achievement of the agreement for the time being and that is all that they require at this stage. However, they will certainly insist on further implementation of the Constitution, for they have said many times that the lifting of the arms embargo will happen through bodies of the federation. That is why I think that the Bosniak-Muslims or people in the Republic of Croatia do not hear enough in their media about this problem. One usually hears that the arms embargo will be lifter on Bosnia or the Muslims, which is absolutely not true. If the embargo were lifted, it would apply to the whole of the Bosnia- Herzegovina Federation. Both for the Croatian Defense Council and for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. If this historic agreement is not realized, it is not very likely that the embargo will be lifted. Consequently, the implementation of the agreement is in the interest of both nations. There is no dilemma for the Croats. The Croats favor and will implement the Washington Agreement. However, we are often blamed, especially in the Sarajevo media, for not wanting the agreement, while exactly the opposite holds true. When Vice President Ganic and myself initiated certain activities, some Bosniak-Muslim leaders accused me of overstepping my authority. That was also meant to slow down the process of the forming of the federation. Those people wanted to realize some aspects of the federation, but only what serves their particular interest.

[Vegar] Do you think that there is a danger of another Croat-Muslim conflict? The rumor among people and some foreign journalists has it that this is very likely.

[Zubak] I do not think that it will come to that. I even think that it is absolutely out of the question. There could be some isolated incidents and even some serious incidents, and that is possible for several reasons. First of all because of resistance on the part of some Bosniak leaders, but tension exists on local levels too. However, I am almost certain that there will be no major military conflicts between the Croats and the Bosniaks. But we must not forget about the influence of various intelligence services that try to provoke conflicts, and the Serbian aggressor very much wants to provoke a conflict. They have been very active in trying to do this in the past couple of days, and they are also using members of other nations for their goals. After all, the analysis of the conflict in central Bosnia shows that the reconstituted former KOS of the former Yugoslav People's Army was very much involved. Therefore, there could be some incidents, but no major conflicts.

Inapposite Comparison With Kladusa

[Vegar] Before your latest visit to Zagreb, Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Mate Granic received Ejup Ganic, vice president of the federation. Do you know what they talked about?

[Zubak] Ganic once again confirmed the readiness of Muslim-Bosniak leadership to support the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. However, they should show this in practice as well. We have made concrete steps to show our support for the federation. The fact that convoys transporting people and goods are allowed to pass corroborates what I have just said, for we could block their way. The Croatian leaders in central Bosnia proposed a zone of full freedom of movement, but the Bosniaks did not accept this. On the other hand, we keep getting demands that would serve Bosniak interests only, and when we make demands that would benefit both nations, such as the full freedom of movement in central Bosnia or passage in some parts of Mostar for example, the Bosniak side is not ready to accept. Speaking of Mostar, let me tell you that Bosniak representatives keep demanding more freedom of movement from the east to the west part of Mostar, even to go back, but we cannot accept that until the Croats are allowed to Gnojnice, Dracevice, Bijelo Polje, and other villages on the left bank of the Neretva River where they lived before the war. We are prepared to discuss the return of Muslims to towns such as Livno, Ljubuski, and Capljina, but the

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Croats must also be allowed to return to Bugojno, Travnik, etc., regardless of the numbers of people, for everybody has the right to return home.

[Vegar] Could you comment on comparisons between west Bosnia and Herceg-Bosna made in public to the effect that they will share the same destiny?

[Zubak] This is absolutely illogical and the two cannot be compared. Representatives of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna have signed an agreement with Bosniak representatives. Moreover, the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna is a legal institution, legalized through the transition regulations of the Federation Constitution. The public does not seem to know all about this, and neither do the SDA officials. They do not know about the relations between the authorities of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic and the authorities of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. The authority of institutions of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna will diminish alongside those of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic. They think that the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna will disappear and the Bosnia- Herzegovina Republic will continue to exist. A while ago, I listened to the leader of the regional committee of the SDA enthusiastically promising that they would settle accounts with the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna, as if he had forgotten or did not know that the representatives of the former Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina signed an agreement with the representatives of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna. The media delusion of the Bosniaks is so great that they simply do not understand the spirit and essence of the Washington Agreement.

[Vegar] To what extent could that be ascribed to their being misinformed and might that be partly the result of sticking to former options?

[Zubak] I think both factors apply. Those who decided to sign the Washington Agreement ought to know that.

UN Reports Renewed Fighting Around Bihac

AU1209182194 Paris AFP in English 1745 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Zagreb, Sept 12 (AFP)—Fighting flared Monday [12 September] between Bosnian government troops and separatist Bosnian and Croatian Serb forces along the frontline in the northwestern Bosnian enclave of Bihac, UN sources said.

The two sides exchanged heavy arms and mortar fire along a 30 kilometre (18 mile) front between Otaka in the southwest of the enclave and Bosanaka Bojna in the northeast, UN spokesman Major Jean-Francois Philippe told AFP by telephone from the region.

Around 900 detonations were recorded during the day, though it was not possible to say which side began the firing, Philippe said.

He noted however that the Bosnian-controlled Otaka region received the largest number of shells, and the Bosnian authorities there evacuated much of the civilian population there.

Monday's resumption of violence followed a day of relative calm Sunday after UN Bosnia commander Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose issued an ultimatum to Serb forces to stop shelling the UN-declared safe haven of Bihac town or face NATO action.

Serb tanks Saturday fired more than 200 shells into the northwestern Bosnian town, 10 of which exploded in civilian areas.

The Serb attacks began last Thursday, a few days after the mainly-Moslem Bosnian army forced out the maverick Serb-backed Moslem leader Fikret Abdic, a millionaire businessman who controlled the northern part of the enclave, after a year-long campaign.

The enclave is surrounded by Serbs in Bosnia to the south and east and in Croatia to the north and west.

In Sarajevo on Sunday Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Croat- Moslem federation, gave qualified support for Rose's threat to order NATO action to punish future Serb attacks on Bihac.

"We welcome the statement that he will activate NATO jets but we are surprised that he didn't do it when they started," Ganic said.

On Saturday, UN spokeswoman Claire Grimes, had warned the United Nations could set up a heavy weapons exclusion zone around Bihac to protect the town's 60,000 inhabitants.

Muslims Inflict 'Huge Losses'

AU1209185594

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1700 GMT on 12 August carries in its regular 30-minute newscast several reports on the military situation in the country.

Reporting from Bihac, Mirza Sadikovic says that "several hundred artillery shells have landed on Bosanska Otoka today. According to the incomplete information, which is understandable in this situation, there have been many casualties, dozens of them, while it is useless even to speak of material damage. As for the Buzim region, the tank and infantry attacks on the defense lines have continued today—particularly from the UN Protected Area, that is, from the so-called Serbian autonomous region of Krajina—by Martic's and Karadzic's chetniks under the command of war criminals Ratko Mladic and Momir Talic. Velika Kladusa has also been attacked today by howitzers, mortars, and antiaircraft weapons. The town itself was shelled from the so-called Serbian autonomous region of Krajina." He says that "the fighters of the 5th Corps have inflicted huge losses

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on the aggressor today both in manpower and equipment. Considerable amounts of weapons have been captured. We believe that we will soon be in the position to report to you about the greatest successes of the 5th Corps against the chetniks."

In his report from the Zvornik front, Enes Hasanovic says that "Godus, (Savci), and Medjedja have today been shelled from the chetnik strongholds of (Klisica) and (Silovo Brdo). The enemy has been firing with small arms and antiaircraft weapons on our defense lines. One woman has been killed, and four other civilians have been wounded in these attacks."

Describing the situation on the Brcko front, Hamid Deronjic says that "today's enemy activities have been limited to artillery fire from a safe distance. The chetnik 60-mm and 82-mm mortars have also been targeting the defense lines on the central part of the front, and the Vranovaca-Omerbegovaca stretch."

Amela Salihodzic reports from Olovo that "the Olovske Luke area has been exposed to attacks from guns and howitzers from the enemy strongholds around the town. Karadzic's criminals have been turning their long-range barrels on civilian targets along the Krivaja River, but there have been no casualties. This evening has been relatively quiet."

The Teocak Press Center reports that "dozens of mortar and tank shells have today been pounding the residential areas of Snjeznica, Omerovici, and (Latikovac), with heavy support from many antiaircraft guns and machine guns, and mobile antiaircraft weapons from [word indistinct]. The material damage is considerable, but there have fortunately been no casualties."

In his report from Gorazde, Enes Musovic says that "after last night's use of guided missiles against (Rudna Glava), the Serbian aggressor today fired mortars at (Renovica). Need I say that these places are within the 20-kilometer zone from the center of Gorazde? As for other parts of the surrounded Gorazde, the chetniks have been firing with antiaircraft weapons and small arms."

Rose on Exclusion Zone

LD1209183494 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] President Radovan Karadzic and vice president Nikola Koljevic of the Srpska republic, and lieutenant colonel general Milan Gvero, deputy chief of staff of the Srpska republic army, held talks in Pale today with General Michael Rose, UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] commander for former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It has been learned that the talks mostly centered on the situation in the Bihac region in the light of the latest Muslim offensive on Serb positions.

We are still examining possibilities of declaring Bihac an exclusion zone, General Rose said after the meeting. In this way the citizens of Bihac—like the citizens of Sarajevo—would be protected in an appropriate way.

General Gvero pointed out that the offensive by the Muslim army's 5th Corps in the Bihac area is still under way, but that Serb forces are refraining from major combat activities. This is being interpreted by the Muslims as encouragement for intensifying their attacks.

General Rose promised that UNPROFOR will use its leverage to compel the Muslims to halt their offensive actions in that zone, General Gvero said.

Wave of Fleeing Refugees

LD1209190294 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] According to Bosnian Serb military sources, a fresh wave of refugees from the western parts of the Cazin Krajina [Bihac pocket] has continued to flow into the republic of Serb Krajina during the course of last night and this morning.

In addition to civilians, a growing number of members of the Fifth Corps of the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Army are joining the refugee columns. Both the civilians and fighters are being welcomed by the bodies of authority of the republic of Serb Krajina, who are providing them with accommodations and elementary means for survival.

The refugees have said in their first statements that General Atif Dudakovic, the commander of the Fifth Corps, has instituted a veritable reign of terror in the area of the Bihac municipality.

Serbs Launch 'Sudden, Fierce Attack' on Teocak

AU1309094994

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0800 GMT on 13 September carries in its regular 10-minute newscast three reports updating the military situation on the Bihac, Teocak, and Sarajevo fronts.

Bihac correspondent Mirza Sadikovic reports that "the joint aggressors are still attacking on the Bihac front. Overnight, and particularly after 2300 they intensified artillery and tank attacks on the outskirts of Cazin and Bihac. Karadzic's and Martic's chetniks have also continued attacking the Buzim and Kladusa regions, that is, Bosanska Otoka, the residential areas of which have been literally razed to the ground. In the fierce counterattacks yesterday and last night, the members of the 505th Chivalrous Motorized Brigade, supported by other units of the 5th Corps, completely destroyed [words indistinct] which have been constantly attacking the Buzim and Bosanksa Otoka area for the past eight days. In the course of this operation our heroes captured

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one tank, destroyed another, seized two tanks, several antiaircraft machine guns and guns, two mortar batteries consisting of 120-mm, 82-mm, and 60-mm mortars, two vehicles, and other military equipment."

Hajrudin Hodzic reports on the situation on the Teocak front saying that the night had been relatively quiet. However, says Hodzic, "the morning hours are marked by fierce tank and infantry attacks at the free Teocak territory. The aggressor in the early morning hours launched a sudden, fierce attack on the forward front lines in (Dinamici) and (Uzanovici). A veritable shower of shells from the entire arsenal at their disposal landed on the forward front lines. Fierce fighting is in progress, but the lions of Teocak are resisting the attacks and at the same time inflicting on the aggressor enormous personnel losses."

The studio announcer cites a report by the 1st Corps Information Center and says that "the chetniks overnight carried out intense small arms provocations along the entire demarcation line, particularly in the region of Vrbanja Most where, firing from [name indistinct] in Grbavica and [words indistinct] Ljubljanska Street they targeted the defense lines in the region of the Jewish Cemetery, Vrbanja Most, and Marijin Dvor. The aggressor set ablaze the woods in Grdonj by firing from a self-propelled Praga antiaircraft gun. On the free Ilidza territory, the chetniks from the direction of the Forestry School used antiaircraft guns to shell the Mt. Igman route. Movements of military vehicles went on as usual overnight."

'Ferocious' Muslim-Serb Fighting Near Mostar

LD1209165294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1619 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Bileca, 12 Sep (TANJUG)—Strong Muslim forces today continued the offensive they launched yesterday on Bijela, Borke, and Glavaticevo in the Konjic municipality, the command of the Herzegovina Corps has announced.

According to the announcement, dead and wounded have been reported on both sides in the most ferocious fighting in this sector of the Herzegovina front since the first year of the war.

Serb military sources claim that Muslim units are poised for an assault in the direction of Nevesinje and Srbinje.

Three British Soldiers Die in Vehicle Accident

LD1209143894 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1422 GMT 12 Sep 94

[By Charles Miller, defense correspondent, PRESS ASSOCIATION News]

[Text] Three British soldiers were killed and five injured in an accident in Bosnia today.

A Saxon armoured vehicle left the road near the beleaguered town of Gorazde and rolled over—tragically repeating an incident last Friday when one soldier died and four were injured. It is expected that an official board of inquiry will be set up to investigate the cause of the two accidents.

The Army said today's tragedy occurred at 1000 when the Saxon overturned two miles north-west of Gorazde while returning to the town from a patrol. The dead and injured were all from the Royal Gloucestershire, Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment. Names of the dead were withheld until relatives were informed. The victims in Friday's incident were from the same regiment, which has been in Bosnia for just two weeks.

"It is an absolute tragedy that the regiment has lost four soldiers in road traffic accidents in just two weeks," said an Army officer.

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Serbs Complain of 'Concession' to Croatia

LD1209172294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1645 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Article by Sava Jankovic]

[Text] Knin, Sept. 12 (TANJUG)—Serb Krajina officials have complained that Croatia and the United Nations have separately revised a key provision of the Croatia-Serb Krajina ceasefire agreement.

The revised provision guaranteeing the freedom of movement to U.N. peacekeepers in monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire agreement was approved in Zagreb on August 2, following a one-month blockade of U.N. facilities organized by Croatian refugees.

Croatia strongly denied any involvement in the blockade until it reached an agreement with the United Nations Protection Force on the procedure for the passage of UNPROFOR convoys and vehicles to the U.N.-protected areas (Serb Krajina).

Serbs in Croatia proclaimed the republic of Serb Krajina in 1991 after Croatia seceded from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian constitution.

The agreement reached between Croatia and UNPROFOR entitles the Croatian side to decide on whether or not to grant passage to U.N. convoys and individual vehicles that must be announced in advance, Serb Krajina authorities said.

The Croatian side also has the right of controlling all 19 check points, together with UNPROFOR, and the right to hold any 'suspicious vehicle.'

Serb Krajina authorities argue that the ceasefire agreement signed between Croatia and the republic of Serb Krajina in Zagreb in March 'does not leave room for the Croatian police working together with UNPROFOR or for any subsequent regulation of this issue.'

On the contrary, the agreement clearly stipulates that all crossings must be open and that the checkpoints of the parties to the conflict must be situated outside the range of small arms fire, Serb Krajina officials say.

That is Serb Krajina views the Croatia-UNPROFOR agrement on controlling the movement of convoys as a drastic revision of the Zagreb ceasefire agreement, the officials explain.

In addition to the parties to the conflict, the ceasefire agreement was also signed by deputy co-chairmen of the conference on the former Yugoslavia Geerd Ahrens and Kai Aide and UNPROFOR Commander for the former Yugoslavia Bertrand de Lapresle.

Serb Krajina officials say that this is a non-principled concession to the Croatian side, and a dangerous precedent.

Izetbegovic Arrives in Zagreb 12 Sep for Visit

LD1209225394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2200 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, arrived in Zagreb yesterday [12 September] on a [word indistinct] working visit to the Republic of Croatia at the invitation of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

The aim of the visit is to attend the summit meeting between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina at which there will be discussion of the functioning of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, relations between Croats and Bosniaks, and [word indistinct] positions of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they will also make a joint assessment of the contact group plan.

In the delegation that is to take part in today's [13 Septemmber] meeting are—apart from Alija Izetbegovic and President of the Federation Kresimir Zubak—Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic; Jadranko Prlic, deputy prime minister and defense minister; Bosnia-Herzegovina presidency member Ivo Komsic; Bosnian Government ministers [word indistinct] Faruk Smailbegovic and [name indistinct]; members of expert groups, and Kasim Trnka, the ambassador of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia.

Tudjman, Izetbegovic Plan To Discuss Issues

AU1209144894 Paris AFP in English 1430 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Zagreb, Sept 12 (AFP)—Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic was due to arrive in the Croatian capital late on Monday [12 September] for talks with President Franjo Tudjman, officials at the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy told AFP.

Izetbegovic, who will meet Tudjman on Tuesday at 6:00 p.m., will be accompanied by Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic and other members of the Bosnian Government.

The embassy said the intergovernment talks would centre on various issues of common interest to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, notably customs and duties and communications. Separate talks will be held at expert level.

Izetbegovic's visit comes a day after the close of a two-day visit to Zagreb by Pope John Paul II who highlighted the plight of war-ravaged Bosnia-Herzegovina and called for greater tolerance and understanding among the communities of former Yugoslavia.

Bosnian Moslems have formed a federation with the republic's Croats who previously, with Zagreb's backing, had sought to form a ministate based in southwestern Bosnia called Herceg-Bosna.

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The federation, which currently holds around 30 percent of Bosnian territory, was formed last March after a bitter conflict between the two communities.

Zagreb's, Pope's Positions 'Well Coordinated'

LD1209151194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1453 GMT 12 Sep 94

[By Nikola Stanojevic]

[Text] Zagreb, Sept. 12 (TANJUG)—According to commentators in Zagreb, both the Croatian Government and the Croatian church are satisfied with the Pope's visit which has lived up to their expectations.

Predictions that the Croatian Government would try to use the Pope's visit for both internal and foreign political goals, have been justified.

Stands by the Vatican and Zagreb were very often so perfectly well coordinated that in his prepared speeches the Pope only repeated what Croatian President Franjo Tudjman had already said. In doing so, the Pope put special emphasis on the fact that the Holy See had always stood by the Croatian people.

The Vatican spearheaded a campaign for premature recognition of the breakaway Yugoslav republic of Croatia in 1991, triggering the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Making no reference to Croats, the Pope said extreme nationalism could not be tolerated. He, however, expressed understanding for 'healthy' patriotism.

The Vatican has evidently accepted the Croatian Government's explanation that nationalist 'excesses' should be tolerated since Croatia is a recently-formed state.

About 14,000 Serbs have been killed in Croatia and 300,000 others expelled from that recently-formed state since the civil war broke out in 1991 as a result of such 'excesses'.

The most important thing for Croatian leaders is that the Pope, urging Croatia's sovereignty over the entire national territory, has not fallen short of their expectations.

Serbs, however, do not want to live in the Croatian state because its government is continuing the policy of genocide against Serbs originating from World War II, when at least 500,000 people were killed, as historians generally agree.

For that reason and because of Croatia's violent secession from the former Yugoslavia, Serbs in their ancestral lands in that former Yugoslav republic in 1991 proclaimed an independent republic of Serb Krajina.

Voicing his support to the Croatian Government, the Pope was acting as the head of state. However, even part of his mass in the Zagreb cathedral was politically colored.

Moreover, for the Serb people his mass was a painful memory of the genocide committed against them in the Nazi puppet 'Independent State of Croatia'.

Making no reference to Ustasha's crimes against Serbs, Jews and Gypsies, the Pope paid tribute to Croatian Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, who had headed the Roman Catholic Church in the Nazi puppet state of Croatia.

The Croatian Ustasha movement was a clerico-fascist paramilitary force responsible for killing hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies in World War II. Ustasha troops joined Nazi formations on the German eastern front in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

Part of Catholic clergy was also included in the genocide against Serbs, Jews and Gypsies in the Nazi puppet state of Croatia. After the war, Stepinac was sentenced to 16 years in prison, but was pardoned two years later.

The Pope, however, said Stepinac had paid with imprisonment his brave opposition to the postwar Yugoslav government's sowing of dissension among the clergy, and to political leaders' attempts to separate the people of God from the Roman Catholic Church.

Pope's paying respect to the grave of Alojzije Stepinac was actually a confirmation of the process of Cardinal Stepinac's canonization, which the Pope Ivan XXIII started immediately after Stepinac's death in 1960.

According to religious circles in Zagreb, the Pope thus pardoned all Croatian priests who were 'unjustly' accused of direct involvement in the crimes against the Serb people.

The process of 'overrating' Stepinac's role began during the preparations for the Pope's visit and was backed by the Croatian Government and part of the press.

They were outspoken in saying that Stepinac had never backed the Ustasha ideology and that, in agreeing to Serbs' conversion into Catholicism, he had to select the lesser of the two evils.

Stepinac's defense lawyers said he made possible the conversion of Serbs to Catholicism 'naturally, not by force, but at their request and primarily to protect their lives.'

The official policy of the then Ustasha government was one third of the Serbs should be murdered, another third converted, and yet another third expelled.

Commentary Analyzes Visit

LD1209221294 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Commentary by correspondent Viktor Tadic]

[Text] Pope John Paul II yesterday ended his two-day pastoral and state visit to the Republic of Croatia, where he had meetings with representatives of the Croatian

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Church, the state president, and state officials. For the church, this was undoubtedly the most important date since the Croats adopted Christianity. At the same time, it was confirmation of the continuing unity of the local church with the Vatican.

For the Republic of Croatia, the pope's visit is yet further confirmation of Croatian sovereignty and independence because the pope's visit also included this dimension. The pope's visit will certainly be analyzed in the world's and the domestic media, but some assessments can already be guessed.

The arrival of the holy father in Croatia was, in political terms, one of his most sensitive missions. Right from the beginning of the preparations for his visit, it was stressed that this was explicitly a pastoral visit, though it was known that such a visit would inevitably also take on elements of a state visit because it would be absurd otherwise. Over a period of time, the notion of a pastoral visit gave way to another—that of a state visit. This is the case to such an extent that, since the pope's return to the Vatican, one can talk of a pastoral and state visit in equal measure, perhaps because the state authorities took on the main burden in organizing the pope's itinerary. For the church and believers this was a pastoral visit, while for the state it was a state visit.

The holy father made several significant speeches, the most important of which was the homily or sermon in front of about 1 million pilgrims at Zagreb's hippodrome. He called on Croats to forgive and look to the future, stressing three imperatives: reconciliation, forgiveness, and the rejection of any nationalistic intolerance. This was something for which everyone must work, including the church, the state, and the people.

The pope's message is not difficult to understand. The church must be the driving force behind mutual forgiveness and peace. This is why the pope on several occasions mentioned the so-called culture of peace, the advocacy of which has to be adhered to without exception by both the church and the state.

He stressed explicitly that he appreciates the martyrdom of the Croatian church in modern history and that it should continue to develop responsibly in freedom. The state is obliged to respect human rights and the rights of national minorities and respect the rule of law generally.

There will be plenty of time to analyze the pope's visit in detail. It should be stated that Croatia did a thoroughly commendable job in hosting the pope, the highest moral authority, and, in line with the excellent organization of the visit, gave him a good sendoff. It is up to us to try to realize those moral and human principles that the holy father offered us as a model during his visit. One thing is certain, and this is the fact that the world will have to take note of and recognize the importance and seriousness of the pope's visit to Croatia and, in facing this fact, at least to some extent, adjust its stances toward Croatia.

Muslims Attack RSK Forces Near Zirovac

LD1309092094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0827 GMT 13 Sep 94

[Text] Knin, 13 Sep (TANJUG)—Two members of the Serb army of Krajina [SVK] have been killed in an infantry attack on the environs of Zirovac village carried out by the 5th Corps of the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, Petrinja Radio reported today quoting a statement by Colonel Zarko Gacic, commander of the SVK's Banija corps.

According to the same source, the attack, which took place yesterday, was repelled successfully following fierce battles. The 5th Corps' units suffered enormous losses.

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Gligorov Stresses Open Borders, Cooperation

AU1209140194 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 12 Sep 94

[Text] In Struga, last Saturday, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of forming the four brigades of the People's Liberation Army and the Antifascist War, Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov stated: "We wish to cooperate with all our neighbors. We want open borders. We are our own masters in our land and no neighboring country will have a privileged status in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]. No one else can master over Macedonia, except or own people. We are now facing new activities and engagements. The war (in the former Yugoslavia) is approaching its end, world's sympathies are on our side, and we must preserve what we have gained. Our aim are open borders, lifted blockades, preserved democracy—in short, we will prove the Macedonian people sets and example for peace and stability in the Balkans. We will enter Europe. We belong in Europe and will prove this by the upcoming elections. Any other option would be a sheer adventure."

Parties Position Themselves for Elections

94BA0387A Skopje VECER in Macedonian 6-7 Aug 94 pp 4-5

[Article by Branko Geroski: "A Bird in the Bush or a Bird in the Hand?"]

[Text] *The party headquarters are clearing up the last major dilemmas before the start of the election campaign.*

After the brief August recess, the deputies in the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] Assembly will probably meet once more (economic laws will be on the agenda), and then Assembly President Stojan Andov will announce the dissolution of this parliament. It has not yet been announced exactly when this will happen, but it is clear even without that that public attention is already focusing on the party headquarters, from which the first salvos are expected after the official designation of the beginning of the upcoming election campaign.

Perhaps as early as the end of this month, the parties will have to declare themselves regarding several major issues in connection with their approach to the elections in November, dilemmas that are still under a veil of uncertainty. Even if there are no more dilemmas regarding the long-announced joint approach of the Social Democrats, Liberals, and Socialists (there are no dilemmas regarding their general commitment to creating a campaign coalition, which does not mean that there are no more or less serious problems with respect to defining the balance of power among the three parties in the coalition), the camp of the fourth member of the ruling coalition, the PDP [Party of Democratic Prosperity], is still dominated by the dilemma of whether it should even participate in the election campaign.

PDP's Abstention or...?

As we know, the failure to pass the new electoral law is a result of the abstention by the PDP's group of deputies. Publicly, the reasons for the Albanian deputies' refusal to pass the new law have been reduced to the battle over the mutual relationship between the "majority" and "proportional" deputies, but that action is being interpreted more as a reaction to the government coalition's unwillingness to embark upon amending the Law on Electoral Districts. Of course, there is a great deal of truth in that interpretation, particularly because of the fact that the current distribution of electoral districts is directly harming the Albanian political parties (they say that the direct damage can be measured precisely, and amounts to at least three fewer deputies' seats for the Albanians). It should be believed, however, that it was quite clear to the PDP's leadership that the government did not have the strength now to get involved in restructuring the electoral districts, not just because such a step would give the opposition parties one more trump card, but also because of the simple truth that it was an enormous job that there was not enough time to do.

It seems that one of the more serious problems for the PDP in connection with the new law is the provision that the elections will be linked to determining the citizenship status of the voters. Having been taught by the unpleasant experience of the recently concluded population census, with that awkward "murky figure" of 100,000 people who do not meet the conditions for obtaining Macedonian citizenship, the PDP is now fleeing registration like fire. The estimates of the real extent of the number of people naturally concern the Albanian political factor the most, since these people are probably mostly voters from "their" constituency. If those people are not allowed to vote, clearly that will have an impact on the Albanian parties' performance, especially in those electoral districts where even in the previous elections they did not have an enormous advantage over the Macedonian parties.

Without Alternative Paths

In the old electoral law, which will be followed in November, there is no direct provision for registration of the voters—you will recall what kind of confusion this led to in the by-election in electoral district 103 in Skopje—which does not mean that this essentially changes the spirit of the electoral regulations. The dominant interpretation is that only Macedonian citizens, however, can participate in the elections, which means that the government can and should be expected to regulate the determination of citizenship status in the next elections through a derivative legal regulation. Finally, it will not be strange at all if this gives rise to a new legal dispute and possibly even a rather serious political dispute.

Few people now think that all of these accumulated unpleasantnesses will give the Albanian political parties, and especially the PDP, enough reason to decide to boycott the upcoming elections. The PDP's new leader, Abdurahman Aliti, recently directly stated in FLAKA: "The idea of boycotting the elections is uncertain, since that implies seeking alternative paths, which we do not have at this moment." Even Merselj Biljali of the NDP

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[People's Democratic Party] states that not participating in the elections will make the situation worse, but adds that the responsibility for that will lie with the Macedonian government. Furthermore, it should be added that in a way, elections under the old electoral law even suit the current PDP leadership, since that would reduce the chances of Menduh Taci's group, which will probably have to put its candidates forward as independents—and that is not easy under the old electoral law. The idea of boycotting the elections is hovering, however, and there are indications that the Albanian political actif (a body formed when the Albanian parties were deciding what to do about the census and how) will meet soon and make a decision on this important issue.

The old electoral law, in spite of all its shortcomings, seems to give the government coalition certain tactical advantages before the elections. Specifically, if the two most powerful opposition parties—the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and the Democratic Party [DP]—do not decide on a campaign coalition, their performance will be extremely uncertain, even in those electoral districts where both parties together would win more votes than the combined ruling parties. We saw a case like that in electoral district 103. Forming a coalition between two rounds of elections is a rather unfortunate solution: In those electoral districts where VMRO-DPMNE and DP would have a chance, their candidates would certainly meet the criterion for the first round (7 percent) and enter the second round, forming a coalition in the second round will involve having one party call upon its voters to vote for the other party in the partnership. There were cases like that in the first elections, but it turned out that they were usually fruitless.

Gosev's Position

Thus, if VMRO-DPMNE and DP are thinking seriously about a coalition, and according to some opinions that is their only chance of winning the elections, the decision has to come before entering the election campaign. Some people were in a hurry to interpret the joint walkout by deputies from the two parties from the Macedonian Assembly session that was discussing a vote of (no) confidence in the government as an act definitely uniting the two parties, but that estimate contained more cynicism than truth, at least then. It appears that the two parties' leaderships are still far from forming a definite campaign coalition and going into the elections with joint candidates.

There are views that it is precisely Petar Gosev who is "to blame" for this. According to those assessments, Gosev's DP has solid, real chances of achieving a good result in these elections. Those who estimate that VMRO-DPMNE's standing was seriously jeopardized after the recent turmoil within the party are in agreement that the parties in the ruling coalition profited little from that. According to the same assessments, the chief profiteer is precisely Gosev's DP, and that will be shown most precisely in the Skopje electoral districts.

Skopje is an interesting phenomenon even without that. After the first elections, as we know, VMRO-DPMNE literally created chaos in the country's capital, leaving what was then SKM-PDP [League of Communists of Macedonia-Party of Democratic Transformation] with a catastrophic three Skopje deputies' seats. Now the situation appears to have changed. One public opinion poll at the time when Gosev still did not have a party infrastructure developed throughout the republic showed that at that time the DP already had a solid standing among Skopje residents—twice as high as the average for the republic. Now, after the internal turmoil that gripped precisely the Skopje VMRO-DPMNE committees, it is thought that what was once the strongest opposition party in the capital does not have even close to the same chances as in the first elections, which makes the position of Gosev's DP even stronger. Of course, the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia]-LP [Liberal Party]-SP [Socialist Party] campaign coalition hopes that it will win several of the "VMRO" electoral districts in the capital (just as the 103d "fell" to Zore Temelkovski-Megi), but that will apparently not substantially reduce the chances of Gosev, whose possible triumph in Skopje will not be considered a surprise.

Union of the Opposition Uncertain

Perhaps it is precisely here that a reason can be sought if a campaign coalition between the two strongest opposition parties does not come about, since, in spite of all the optimistic predictions that naturally have to be made in public, serious opposition politicians are aware that final triumph in the elections is a "bird in the bush," but what can realistically be won is a "bird in the hand." The awkward thing is that an opposition coalition really does yield some chance to win the elections, but with joint candidates, the possible defeat will be even more serious for each party individually. Furthermore, there are also serious internal obstacles and reservations within the two parties about the idea of forming a campaign coalition. Just as the process of reaching an agreement on joint candidates is not an easy one even among the parties in the ruling coalition, that process will also be difficult, if not more difficult, among the opposition parties.

In any case, these major dilemmas will be cleared up soon, or rather, the answers will be made public, since there have been unconfirmed reports that behind the closed doors of the party headquarters, allegedly everything is already crystal clear, and that a great deal of work is being done on drawing up the lists of candidates. The public is curiously awaiting the names of the party candidates, after which the partying can begin.

According to all the indications, we have ahead of us a fierce election campaign, the opening of party dossiers, the airing of dirty laundry, and so forth—as is customary, after all.

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Human Rights Activist on Macedonians in Greece

94BA0388A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 6 Aug 94 p 13

[Interview with Kole Mangov, president of the Dignity Society, by Aleksandar Damovski; place and date not given: "Individualization Against Discrimination"]

[Text] *Documentation from 400 cases on the current situation of the Greek authorities' discrimination against Macedonians who are citizens of many countries; no interest on the part of the Macedonian authorities; everything has been reduced to the good will and enthusiasm of individuals.*

The Dignity Society has already been active for four years as a nonpartisan, nongovernmental, and nonprofit civic association whose activity is mainly focused on protecting Macedonians' human rights against discrimination by the Republic of Greece. In contrast to other similar associations, Dignity conducts its activity by collecting and completing detailed documentation on the Greek authorities' discrimination against Macedonians originating from Aegean Macedonia, strictly based on individual cases. That kind of approach to the rigid and pragmatic international organizations for the protection of human rights, and to others as well, is proving to be one of the most productive with respect to those institutions. Dignity's president, Kole Mangov, considers it the most productive method in a situation like this, without any stronger political influence.

[Mangov] I can freely state that so far really significant work has been done in our field of activity, both with respect to other organizations in this field within Macedonia and outside of it, and with respect to the quality and quantity of the work that has been completed. I am saying this primarily because of the fact that our approach to this problem, taking action against discrimination by the Republic of Greece on an individualized basis, has not yet been accepted by other similar organizations. Thus, expert guidance on how the individual should be protected against Greek discrimination, which in my opinion is the only correct way to proceed with international institutions, has unfortunately not yet been accepted by the other similar organizations, primarily outside Macedonia. Only the Macedonian Movement for Balkan Prosperity in Aegean Macedonia, which is headquartered in Sobotsko, has accepted that kind of approach—individual protection—as part of its activity. For example, the latest case with the individuals Sekrev and Suvcanov from Ovcareni, whom the Greek border authorities kept from crossing from that side to Medzitlija; the Movement, handling these cases appropriately, immediately alerted the international public to protect them.

[Damovski] How large are Dignity's archives? How many files does the society have?

[Mangov] So far the Dignity Society has processed over 400 cases, which means that that many cases of the Greek authorities' violation of human rights have been processed. We can add to this number the cases of 57 individuals, Macedonians who are citizens of the Republic of Greece, for protection before the appropriate international institutions. We also have the case of Djorgi Misalis, a Macedonian, whose Greek citizenship was revoked as a "sanction" because of his free and public expression of the Macedonian national identity in Australia, as a citizen there. The case of Done Rakovski, a Canadian citizen, on whose passport the Greek border authorities stamped "forbidden entry into Greece," is likewise quite interesting to European human rights experts.

[Damovski] What does such a file include, and what does the processing by the Dignity Society consist of?

[Mangov] It includes the factual situation concerning an individual whose personal statement, signature, and evidence confirm that some sort of action has been committed that we characterize in terms of some standard in the field of human rights. That is the main thing. It is precisely for that reason that a high degree of professionalism and expertise is really necessary for all of this work; but there are few experts and people interested in financing this activity. For the time being, it all comes down to just the good will and enthusiasm of individuals.

Misunderstandings

[Damovski] With regard to the society's international activity, can you tell us how far it has gotten, to which forums, and to what extent people are discussing your petitions, reports, appeals...?

[Mangov] International activity is taking place in the sphere of human rights, in the political sphere, and in legal proceedings. As far as the first is concerned, it means that we come before various associations and state representatives with legal and factual arguments for protection on the basis of human rights standards. With those arguments concerning violation of the human rights of Macedonians, Greek citizens who live in Greece and Greek citizens, Macedonians, who live outside of Greece—in Macedonia, Canada, the United States, Australia, Russia, the Czech Republic, Poland.... Those are not just contacts with human rights organizations, but also meetings and correspondence with representatives of the authorities of many countries, and with a large number of parliamentary delegations visiting Macedonia. For example, after a meeting with Senator Willi Kuypers of Belgium, after the delivery and processing of our argumentation, he decided to go on a 10-day visit to Greece, where he and his 17-member team had a large number of meetings with Macedonians in that country. There is also William van Leycken, a Belgian TV reporter, who went to Greece after talking with me, and was one of the first world reporters who depicted the situation of Macedonians in Greece two years ago. Among other things, there is also the presentation of Dignity in this year's March issue [as published] of NEWSWEEK.

[Damovski] What problems are you encountering in contacts with similar Macedonian associations outside of Macedonia?

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[Mangov] In the political sphere of our activity, in contacts with them, they rule out the individual approach, giving priority to political means. What is the political power of Macedonians, for instance, in Canada, Australia, or America, and what political party is openly supporting their activity? There is nothing like that. For anything like that, you first have to be a powerful political entity. My approach is first to create the legal arguments by which influence can be exerted later on in the political sphere. In the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], we are trying to succeed in focusing some party activities on that aspect. Unfortunately, the response here has been very poor. For example, even after the last petition from Dignity was accepted for proceedings before the European Parliament, it was included for debate in the Macedonian Assembly as well. And it ended there, when at the 68th Assembly session (in November 1993), at the proposal of SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] Deputy Nikola Popovski, it was removed from the agenda "because it is a petition from a nongovernmental institution." I wonder whether, for instance, if some environmental society proposed some sort of discussion of pollution in Lake Ohrid, such an initiative would suffer the same fate as Dignity's petition. In December 1993, however, that same party included some of Dignity's activity as part of its 1994 platform, which still means something.

Petition in Proceedings

[Damovski] Procedurally, what is the fate of that petition before the European Parliament?

[Mangov] The petition has to do with all acts of discrimination by Greece against Macedonians, and is also associated with the incomplete recognition of the Republic of Macedonia by prohibiting the full and free expression of Macedonian national identity and freedom of movement through all the torture of European institutions with respect to this issue. For the time being the petition is only in proceedings, and we, together with the Macedonian Movement for Balkan Prosperity, are preparing a supplement to that document, which will be signed by the two organizations, and, we hope, by other Macedonian associations as well.

[Damovski] In attempts to interpret the Greek-Macedonian dispute, one often hears the theory that one of the reasons is the existence of the Macedonian national minority in Greece. To what extent can the kind of arguments that Dignity possesses be used in the current negotiations with our southern neighbor?

[Mangov] Our documentation refers to the possession of the property of Macedonian citizens (over 5,000 so far) in Greece, and illustrates individual discrimination by the Greek authorities; that documentation shows that in 1912 Greece entered Macedonia like an occupied territory, and shows the destruction of the Macedonian cultural heritage in Greece.... When we present that kind of documentation to foreign delegations, they are simply astonished. Now, why the Macedonian government is not treating this problem from this standpoint does not interest us, it only irritates us.

[Damovski] Has any government official come to you, asked for some sort of assistance, aid, advice...?

[Mangov] No, no, no.... I can only explain it as some sort of egotism on the part of the authorities, i.e., only their methods will be successful. So far, that model has proven to be unsuccessful. For example, the high level of treatment of this subject matter is obvious from the correspondence with Jacques Delors; unfortunately, it is not encountering that sort of treatment at home.

Joint Activity in the Greek Elections!

[Damovski] The last attempt for some sort of initiative by the official Macedonian authorities along these lines seems to have been the last socialist government's initiative for a census of the property of the Macedonians deported from Greece. Since then there has been nothing from the authorities, at least as far as the public knows. Why is that?

[Mangov] Yes, that was the last attempt to start some sort of legal proceedings with Greece, to which the Greeks obviously did not respond. The government, however, has countless other ways to allow the individual presentation of these acts of discrimination to international factors. What has happened, this distorted recognition of Macedonia, is a violation of our identity, the freedom to express our identity. I am not a Former Yugoslav Macedonian. Consequently, a climate has to be created for broad guidance of activities to express our full national identity. I do not know why it is being held back and it is not being done. That is a tremendous omission, however.

[Damovski] What will Dignity's next activities consist of?

[Mangov] Both previously and now, we have thought that all of this activity should be taken over by a nongovernmental agency that will, above all, treat this material professionally and in accordance with all the international standards for the protection of human rights. Until then, we are continuing the job of renewing the petition before the European Parliament, acting together with the Macedonian Movement for Balkan Prosperity. We will likewise try to work on ensuring the conditions—citizenship and identity papers—for Macedonians who are citizens of many other countries but originate from Aegean Macedonia to participate in the next Greek elections, within the framework of the activities of the Macedonian party in Greece, Vinozito. Before that, however, the procedure for all of this has to be thoroughly studied.

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Federal

Simic Letter Urges Intervention Against Serbs

LD1209203994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1818 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Geneva, Sept. 12 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Zeljko Simic has asked international mediators to intervene in Croatia against the current mobilization of Serbs.

He asked David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg to exert influence on the Croatian Government to discontinue the mobilisation of Serbs in the western Croatian region of Gorski Kotar.

The Yugoslav mission at the United Nations in Geneva communicated Simic's letter to the mediators on Monday.

Simic said the Republic of Croatia in August started to mobilize Serbs in the Gorski Kotar region, most districts of which are predominantly Serb-populated.

The mobilization has been carried out in Gornja Srpska Moravica, Partizanski Drezenci, Jasenak, Gomirje and Ponikva, he said.

The mobilized Serbs from Gornji Kotar are sent by the Croatian authorities to the front towards the republic of Serb Krajina, Simic said.

The mobilization, said Simic, was in violation of an agreement between the Serbs and the Croatian authorities signed July 6, 1992, in Vrbovsko, a town in Gorski Kotar. The agreement obliged Croatia not to mobilize Serbs from Gorski Kotar, said Simic.

The mobilization was in discrepancy also with the 1966 international pact on civil and political rights, he said.

It was only the latest example in a series of drastic pressures the Croatian authorities had brought to bear on the Serbs in Gorski Kotar, Simic said.

The letter to the mediators said that the Serb-populated part of Gorski Kotar has long been surrounded by a Croatian force 20,000 strong, 35 tanks and 20 personnel carriers.

Such Croatian policy of attempted eviction or assimilation has made the overall position of the Serbs in Gorski Kotar deteriorate drastically, said Simic.

Since the conflict broke out when Croatia seceded from the former Yugoslavia, nearly 300,000 Serbs have moved from Croatia.

The republic of Serb Krajina has been a U.N.-Protected Area since March 1992.

Before the current mandate of peacekeepers in the UNPAs [UN Protected Areas] expires on September 30, Croatia has now renewed its threats to "reimpose its rule" in the republic of Serb Krajina.

Text of Letter

LD1209151494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1256 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Geneva, 12 Sep (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav mission at the United Nations in Geneva today forwarded a letter by Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Zeljko Simic to Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, the cochairmen of the peace conference on the former Yugoslavia. The letter reads:

"I feel compelled to write this letter to you because of the very difficult position of the Serbs in Gorski Kotar in the Republic of Croatia.

"In August this year the Republic of Croatia began the forcible mobilization of Serbs from that region. The Croatian authorities send the mobilized Serbs from Gorski Kotar to the front facing the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK]. According to information available to us, the mobilization has been carried out in Gornja Srpska Moravica, Partizanska Dreznica, Jasenak, Gomirje, Ponikve, and other villages.

"The mobilization violates the agreement between the Serbs and the Croatian authorities of 6 July 1992 which was signed in Vrbovsko in which Croatia officially promised not to mobilize the Serbs from Gorski Kotar into its army.

"These actions by the Croatian authorities contravene the international charter on civil and political rights of 1966.

"The mobilization of Serbs in Gorski Kotar is yet another example of the Croatian authorities exerting drastic pressure on the Serbs. You are probably familiar with the fact that the Serb-populated part of Gorski Kotar has long been surrounded by a heavy military force, including 20,000 soldiers, 35 tanks, and 20 armored carriers. The overall position of Serbs in this part of Croatia has drastically deteriorated due to this Croatian policy. It is evident that the Croatian authorities are trying to force them into emigration or assimilation.

"Without doubting your understanding of the seriousness of this matter, I ask you to exercise, as much as you can, your influence on the Government of the Republic of Croatia and persuade it to comply with agreements, put an end to the mobilization of Serbs, and secure basic human rights for the Serbs of Gorski Kotar."

Sainovic on Sanctions, 'New Economic Philosophy'

LD1209155694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1154 GMT 12 Sep 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Sept. 12 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic said Sunday that lifting

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sanctions against Yugoslavia would enable the country to join world economic and monetary trends.

The United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions against Yugoslavia in May 1992 for alleged involvement in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Yugoslav experts say that the Yugoslav economy has lost at least 30 billion dollars as a result of the sanctions.

Participating in a panel discussion organized by TANJUG, Sainovic said that Yugoslavia's economic recovery program launched in late January was being successfully implemented.

Sainovic said that judging by the results shown so far, the target GNP growth of at least 5 percent might well be achieved.

This trend, combined with a lifting or easing of the sanctions, would mean 'opening doors to a recovered economy', healthy currency and new economic philosophy, said Sainovic.

He said that the monetary reconstruction program had been almost fully implemented.

'When the program was launched in January, the money supply totalled 80 million dinars, according to the value of the dinar today. In the meantime, it has grown to two billion dinars,' said Sainovic.

The stable exchange rate of the dinar, stable prices, pay rises and, most importantly, production growth, all show that the program will be fully implemented, he said.

Sainovic admitted that the sanctions were a problem, but said no real obstacles existed for cooperation and future business deals.

He also said his recent visits to Russia and Libya were aimed at helping Yugoslav companies establish business contacts.

'Yugoslavia will continue to strengthen the existing cooperation ties and promote economic relations with other countries, such as China and India whose markets are vast and which have maintained a correct attitude towards our policy,' said Sainovic.

He also spoke of vast possibilities of Yugoslavia's cooperation with neighboring states because of the complementarity of their resources and industrial potential.

Montenegrin Prime Minister Views Sanctions

LD0909201694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1955 GMT 9 Sep 94

[Text] Podgorica, Yugoslavia, 9 Sep (TANJUG)—Montenegrin Premier Milo Djukanovic said Friday he expected that the sanctions against Yugoslavia might be eased rather than lifted.

Speaking at a press conference in the Montenegrin capital of Podgorica, Djukanovic said that the future of the sanctions was still very much a matter for speculation.

The United Nations Security Council imposed comprehensive sanctions on the Yugoslav federation of Serbia and Montenegro in May 1992 following allegations of the country's involvement in civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Djukanovic said Montenegrin functionaries, in numerous talks with foreign officials, had insisted that any easing of the sanctions must provide for deblocking the maritime fleet, whose blockade is Montenegro's biggest problem under the sanctions.

He said Montenegro deserved some credit for its cooperative attitude to the international community in the past two years.

Djukanovic said he hoped that the international community would at least let ships stranded by the sanctions in foreign waters return to Montenegro.

FYROM Claim on Border Incident Disputed

LD1209173394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1659 GMT 12 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, 12 Sep (TANJUG)—In its letter to the Foreign Ministry of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], the Federal Yugoslav Foreign Ministry has rejected as groundless and false the claims contained in the FYROM Foreign Ministry's note regarding the incident of 1 September at the intersection of the Debelde-Tanusevci roads, and the alleged wounding of Macedonian national Saciri Maskut Bajram by a Yugoslav patrol.

In connection with these allegations, the relevant Yugoslav bodies have carried out a comprehensive investigation and unequivocally concluded that the incident never took place.

It was pointed out in the Federal Foreign Ministry's reply that the practice of reporting fabricated incidents is aimed at creating tensions in the border areas and can in no way contribute to the normalization of relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the FYROM.

Well-informed Yugoslav sources have assessed that the Macedonian side concocted this incident in order to dodge its own responsibility for the border incidents of 20 and 29 August, when Macedonian border patrols killed two Yugoslav nationals and wounded one.

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